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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, courts and commentators have focused on the federalism-based 
limits on the power of the federal government, with significantly less attention 
given to similar constraints on state power.  It is not surprising, therefore, that 
both camps have overlooked that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, with their 
reservation of both rights and power “to the people” contain a popular 
sovereignty principle that affects the constitutionality of various state election law 
regulations.  This goal of this Article is to reaffirm that the people are, in essence, 
part of the federalism equation, and not simply as protectors of state power, but as 
sovereign entities in their own right.  
 
This Article contends that the power that the people had to “alter or abolish” their 
state governments following the Revolutionary War is the foundation of the right to 
vote in state elections.  The Founding generation considered the alter or abolish 
power to be a natural right and an expression of popular sovereignty that followed 
the people into the Union upon the ratification of the Constitution.  Once this 
power was circumscribed during the Civil War era, the people used the right to 
vote as the vehicle to express this sovereign authority.  Thus, voting, as the heir to 
the alter or abolish power, is part of the bundle of participatory rights preserved 
by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments’ reservation of “rights” and “power,” 
respectively, to the people.  
 
Given its genesis, these amendments provide a better conceptual foundation for the 
right to vote in state elections than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Respect for its popular sovereignty foundations demand that the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in assessing burdens on the right to vote, acknowledge the 
reliance interest that the people retain in actively participating in the democratic 
process at the state level, an interest preserved by the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments.  Both amendments illustrate the hybrid nature of suffrage as one part 
sovereign power and one part fundamental right, which should influence the 
judicial means-ends assessment of restrictions on the right to vote in state 
elections.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The right to vote is a bundle of contradictions.  The Supreme Court has framed it 
as “preservative of all other rights,” explicitly holding that there is a constitutional 
right to vote in federal elections.
1
  Yet the Court stops short of according the same 
protection to the right to vote in state elections, even though the Constitution 
explicitly links state voter qualifications to participation in federal elections.
2
  Part 
of this confusion stems from the Court’s conception of voting as a right that 
derives from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, holding 
that states can choose whether to extend the right, but once available, it has to be 
extended on equal terms.
3
  This Article illustrates that voting in state elections is 
better understood, not as an equal protection fundamental interest subject to 
retraction at will,
4
 but as the centerpiece of a bundle of participatory rights that 
citizens used during the Founding era to directly influence and participate in 
government at the state level.  While scholars have acknowledged the connection 
between voting and popular sovereignty,
5
 none have properly conceptualized it as 
the rightful heir of the power that the people had to “alter or abolish” their state 
                                                 
1
 Harper v. State Bd. of Elec.  See also Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elec., 360 
U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (inferring from various provisions of the Constitution that “the right of 
suffrage is established and guaranteed” for federal elections but noting that the substance of 
the right is “established by the laws and Constitution of the State”).  
2
 Id.  See James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community, and the Constitutional Structure of 
Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 893, 894 
(“In a contradiction unparalleled in constitutional law, the Court has said both that the 
Constitution ‘undeniably’ protects the right to vote in state and federal elections and that 
that the right to vote ‘is not a constitutionally protected right.’”).   
3
 14
th
 Am; Harper 
4
 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 114 (1973) (“The right 
to vote in federal elections is conferred by Art. I, § 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment of 
the Constitution, and access to the state franchise has been afforded special protection 
because it is ‘preservative of other basic civil and political rights’”).  Commentators have 
criticized the equal protection conception of voting, but still treats right to vote as identical 
in state in federal elections.  See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Voting Rights and the Third 
Reconstruction, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 159, 164-65 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. 
Siegel, eds., 2009).  
5
 See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness 
As a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 301, 
315 (1991) (arguing that voting is “a means to affirm the philosophy of popular 
sovereignty”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment 
Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 487-94 (1994); Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, 
Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance (2002).  See also Gray v. 
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (linking an equally weighted vote directly to the principle of 
popular sovereignty). 
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governments following the Revolutionary War.
6
  After the Civil War, the power to 
alter or abolish state government was domesticized, as the Reconstruction era 
rejected the violence inherent in the right due to its role in southern secession, and 
transitioned to more peaceful expressions of this authority by implementing a more 
robust right to vote in state constitutions.   
 
The thesis of this Article is that the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of “rights to 
the People” can provide an interpretive framework for understanding the sovereign 
power “not delegated to the United States” and “reserved… to the people” in the 
Tenth Amendment,
7
 power that found its expression, first through the “alter or 
abolish” provisions in state constitutions, and later through the exercise of specific 
political rights including, most importantly, the right to vote.
8
  Because the right to 
vote derives from the people’s sovereign authority to “alter or abolish” their 
governments at the Founding,
9
 a power that was not delegated to the federal 
government upon ratification, both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments illustrate the 
hybrid nature of voting as a “power-right,” or one part sovereign power and one 
part fundamental right.
10
  This framework is reducible to general principles that 
                                                 
6
 Many state constitutions adopted in the post-Revolutionary era had alter or abolish 
provisions, which bestowed in people the inalienable right to change or dismantle their 
state governments at any time. 
7
 U.S. Const. amend. X.  Some scholars associate the “alter or abolish” authority with 
the Ninth Amendment,  see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights (describing the power of 
the people to alter or abolish their governments as “the most obvious and inalienable right 
underlying the Ninth Amendment”), but arguably, it is better conceptualized as both a 
natural right to abolish government and a means by which voters express their sovereign 
power since this authority could be exercised outside of the confines of government 
institutions.  See Fritz, supra note , at 24 (noting that people were not bound by “existing 
procedures for change in the Constitution” in exercising the alter or abolish authority).   
8
 The argument that the Ninth Amendment can serve as an interpretive framework for 
understanding the powers preserved by the Tenth Amendment is a view commonly 
associated with Kurt Lash.  See Lash, supra note , at 410 (“The Tenth declares the principle 
of enumerated federal power. The Ninth controls the interpretation of those powers. In 
situations where Congress has implausibly extended its enumerated powers, this would call 
into play both Amendments: the Ninth, as establishing the proper rule of construction, and 
the Tenth, as prohibiting the exercise of any power not fairly attributable to an enumerated 
power.”).   
9
 See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 722 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the Ninth Amendment is the source of the constitutional right to vote in state 
elections).   
10
 See generally James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing 
Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 189, 203 ( ) 
(referring to elections in a republican government as “a limited or specialized act of 
sovereign choice designating a particular individual to exercise specific government 
powers as the people’s agent”).   See also Vikram David Amar and Alan Brownstein, The 
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courts can employ in assessing the means/ends fit of state election regulations that 
affect voting rights, and it protects the reliance interest that the people have had, 
since at least Civil War era, in using suffrage as a means to express their sovereign 
will.  
 
In critiquing the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, the legal scholarship has 
ignored the link between voting and state alter or abolish provisions, leading to 
undertheorized conceptions of the right that do not protect voting rights any more 
than the Court’s flawed version of the right.  Much of the scholarly confusion 
stems from the failure to give meaning to one simple word: “or.”  The Tenth 
Amendment in its entirety provides that, “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the 
states respectively, or to the people.”11  The use of the word “or” in the phrase 
“reserved to the states respectively, or the people” strongly suggests that the people 
have reserve power that is independent of the powers retained by the state, a 
possibility that has been ignored because of the state-centered view of the Tenth 
Amendment that has dominated the legal scholarship.
12
  Questions arise about how 
to translate this power into judicially accessible principles that can protect and give 
substance to this sovereign authority that the people retain under the Tenth 
Amendment.  The Ninth Amendment,
13
 with its acknowledgement of “certain 
rights…retained by the People,” 14 arguably provides a workable framework for the 
                                                                                                                            
Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 915, 925 (1999) (“Voting is about the 
exercise of power. It operates as the mechanism through which popular sovereignty directs 
the actions of the government.”). 
11
  
12
 Cf. Lash, supra note at 391-395 (interpreting the retained rights of the people and the 
autonomy of the states collectively instead of separately).  See also Lash, supra note , at 31, 
33 (arguing that “Madison…equated the retained rights of the states with the collective 
interests of the ‘local’ people” because the people retained the ability to replace their 
representatives at the next election cycle but there are also “numerous references to 
retained individual rights”).  The trend in the legal scholarship has been to conflate the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments because both stand for the principle that the powers not 
delegated to the federal government have been reserved, see Randy Barnett, “James 
Madison’s Ninth Amendment,” in The Rights Retained by the People 8 (1989) (criticizing 
this approach), but this does not mean that the Tenth Amendment should have no bearing 
on what rights are retained by the People under the Ninth Amendment, given that both 
reference the People.  See Lash, supra note , at 75 (arguing that the term “shall not be 
construed” in the Ninth Amendment shows that its “sole textual function is control the 
interpretation of other provisions,” notably the Tenth).     
13
 The Ninth Amendment states, “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the People.” U.S. Const. 
amend. IX. 
14
 Most interpretations of the Ninth and Tenth Amendment view them as constraining 
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sovereign power that the people retain; in fact, many scholars have argued that the 
Ninth Amendment is the source of the right of the people to alter or abolish 
government, making it the natural home of the right’s predecessor, the right to 
vote.  
 
Indeed, the popular sovereignty origins of the right to vote are part of a broader 
tradition of “practical” sovereignty which was, during the revolutionary period, 
“the principle of the power of the people to destroy the constitution they created,”15 
and this power to alter or abolish later provided the theoretical basis for 
fundamental law premised on the consent of the govern.
16
  The right of revolution 
that justified the colonists’ rebellion against Britain in 1776 evolved from a right to 
alter or abolish government through sometimes violent means to enforcing 
fundamental law against “errant rulers” through the exercise of political rights, 
including the rights of petition, assembly, speech, and, most important, the right to 
vote.
17
  The Civil War era cemented the evolution of this power from one focused 
                                                                                                                            
only the federal government.  Indeed, one way around this, embraced by some scholars, is 
to argue that the Ninth Amendment rights constrain the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.  Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the 
Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determining Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive 
Due Process, 32 U. Balt. L. Rev. 169 (2003).  See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that the Ninth itself does not apply against the states, but 
that the Fourteenth protects the same set of retained rights).  This Article does not embrace 
the incorporation argument because it obscures the nature of the rights that the Article 
seeks to protect—those based on the sovereign authority embraced by the Tenth 
Amendment that owe their existence to the character of state governments at the time of the 
Founding (rather than at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment).  See also Lash, supra 
note , at 245 (rejecting incorporation of the Ninth through the Fourteenth Amendment).  
15
 Fritz, supra note , at 279. See Lash, supra note , at 341 (“Scholars have identified the 
term “the people,” as used in the Bill of Rights and in the Preamble of the Constitution, as 
an expression of popular sovereignty - the idea that ultimate authority is retained by the 
people who may alter or abolish their system of government as they see fit.”). 
16
 Kramer, supra note , at 11-13.  See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the 
Governed, Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 483 
(describing popular sovereignty as a concept that has historically been based on majority 
rule).  While the notion of who “the people” are has changed over the course of the last two 
centuries, see U.S. Const. amend. XV, IXX, XXVI, the idea that “the people” should have 
the ability to participate in the mechanics of state government, primarily through voting, to 
a much greater extent than at the federal level has changed very little during this time.  See 
Part II, infra.  See also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2000).  Keyssar notes 
that “all of the early state constitutions (except that of Delaware) treated the right to vote as 
a matter of fundamental—and thus constitutional—law, rather than statute law”, id. at 20, 
while “citizenship in the new nation – controlled by the federal government – was divorced 
from the right to vote.”  Id. at 24. 
17
 Kramer, supra note , at 25 (“The community itself had both a right and a 
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on violent overthrow to the belief that the legitimacy of government is determined 
by periodic elections that are an accurate gauge of public sentiment.
18 
 The Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments incorporated these majoritarian sentiments, protecting 
those rights and powers of the people that were central to their status as the 
ultimate sovereigns.
19
  Given these populist origins, voting as a power-right, 
although a federal constitutional guarantee, is defined primarily by state 
constitutional law and applies against both the states and the federal government.
20
  
                                                                                                                            
responsibility to act when the ordinary legal process failed, and unconstitutional laws could 
be resisted by community members…Means of correction and forms of resistance were 
well-established and highly structured.  First and foremost, was the right to vote…Next in 
importance, though perhaps not effectiveness, was the right to petition, together with what 
became its corollary, the newly emerging right of assembly.”).  See also Fritz, supra note , 
at 281 (noting that his concept of collective sovereign and Kramer’s theory of popular 
constitutionalism “are not synonymous” because “[p]opular constitutionalism involves 
actions to interpret and enforce the constitution” and “the idea of [the people as] a 
collective sovereign is a broader foundational principle that justified the creation, revision, 
and even the destruction of constitutions”).  As Part II shows, theories of collective 
sovereignty as a justification for constitutional change became less popular because of the 
violence inherent in the theory’s view that people could “destroy” constitutions, and 
popular sovereignty through the exercise of political rights became an important 
replacement that arguably, as Part III illustrates, affected the Constitution’s protection of 
these rights.  See id. at 281 (noting that “popular constitutionalism comes into play only 
when a constitution already exists” and its “effectiveness against official action stems from 
its exertion of political pressure rather than from a recognition that government is the agent 
of the people”).        
18
 Keyssar, supra note , at 24 (stating that the “experience of the revolution—the 
political and military trauma of breaking with a sovereign power, fighting a war, and 
creating a new state—served to crack the ideological framework that had upheld and 
justified a limited suffrage”) 
19
  
20
 [cite to old supreme ct precedent treating state power as plenary in this area] 
Textually, it is not clear that the Tenth Amendment has to be read to limit only the powers 
of the federal government, although such a view may be ahistorical.  See footnote infra.  
Nonetheless, the Ninth Amendment does not have to be read in such a limited manner 
because, unlike the Tenth Amendment, it is not overly burdened by precedent.  See United 
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); See also Massey, supra note at 1248.  As 
Massey notes, the Ninth Amendment has not been incorporated against the states through 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because “at least at this point in our 
constitutional history, there is thought to be virtually nothing to incorporate.”  Id. Massey 
argues, however, that “because ninth amendment rights originate in and derive substance 
from state constitutional law they also apply to the state of origin through the constitution 
of the state.”  Id.  See also Lash, supra note , at 248-267 (reconciling the Ninth Amendment 
with the Fourteenth Amendment).  
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This framework is consistent with the framers’ expectations that state, rather than 
federal, law would be the source of the right to vote.
21
 
 
This Article is divided into three parts.  Part I shows that the equal protection 
conception of the right to vote is erroneous and does not account for the reliance 
interest that people have in participating in governance at the state level, which is 
central to understanding how voting is a “power-right” that furthers the people’s 
use of their sovereign authority.
22
  Equal protection wrongly presents the right to 
vote is permissive in state elections, subject to retraction by state authorities as 
they see fit, or as it applies to both state and federal elections, subject to extensive 
and restrictive regulation at the hands of state authorities.
23
  In reality, the only 
context in which the Constitution allows states to retract the right to vote is for 
presidential elections,
24
 and its popular sovereignty foundations suggest that the 
right is mandatory for all other state and federal elections.
25
 Part II engages in a 
historical analysis that supports this point, illustrating that, while the rights that 
people retain against the federal government are necessarily mitigated by the 
compromises in the text and structure that impose representative government,
26
 the 
Republican Form of Government Clause of Article IV (“the Guarantee Clause”) 
mandates only that republicanism serve as a floor, rather than a ceiling, on the type 
of government that can be adopted at the state level.
27
  As a result, states have, 
since the Founding, opted for governments that are significantly more 
“democratic” than that which exists at the federal level, with the people directly 
electing almost all of their state officials; and later, enjoying an explicit right to 
                                                 
21
 See, e.g., Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 790 (1995) (discussing “a proposal made by the 
Committee of Detail that would have given Congress the power to add property 
qualifications” which was rejected because James Madison argued that “such a power 
would vest ‘an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature,’ by which the Legislature 
‘can by degrees subvert the Constitution.’ ”) (certain internal quotations marks omitted) 
(quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 533–34 (1969)). 
22
 All states had some variation of the right to vote during the colonial period, the 
scope of which expanded throughout the Founding era and varied by location. See Keyssar, 
supra note , at 8-21.  The right to vote and the burdens that states place on the right also 
have evolved such that comparisons will have to be drawn. There may not be a popular 
sovereignty right to participate in early voting, for example, but if the state provided early 
voting and then rescinded it, the Court would take the popular sovereignty principle into 
account and closely scrutinize the state’s reasons.  Cf. 
http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/arizona/capitol_media_services/article_8a05991e-7f04-
11e3-8a04-001a4bcf887a.html.    
23
 See Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections  
24
 See U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 1. 
25
 See  
26
 See John Manning, the Generality Problem in Constitutional Law  
27
 See Part I, infra. 
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vote and participating directly in lawmaking through initiatives and referenda 
under virtually all state constitutions.
28
  Given the choice of democracy as a 
foundational principle at the state level and, moreover, that the constitutional 
standard for who can be a “voter” in both state and federal elections is derived 
primarily from state law,
29
 part III makes the normative claim that consideration of 
the popular sovereignty origins of the right to vote require that courts credit the 
reliance interest that voters had in the preexisting regime that governed their state’s 
election apparatus.  Where the contested state regulation constricts the right to vote 
compared to the preexisting rule, then the Court should apply heightened 
scrutiny.
30
  Thus, the balancing test derived from Anderson v. Celebrezze,
31
 
Burdick v. Takushi,
32
 and Crawford v. Marion County
33
 that the Court has 
employed to assess both direct and indirect restrictions on the right to vote has to 
be reformulated to replace the Court’s blind deference to state authorities with a 
framework that assesses regulations from the baseline of both the states’ 
considerable authority to regulate the electoral arena and the rights of participation 
that voters retain to participate in state level governance, rights that find their 
expression through the right to vote.
34
    
                                                 
28
 See, e.g., Minor v. Happerset, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (“It is true that the United States 
guarantees to every State a republican form of government…The guaranty necessarily 
implies a duty on the part of the States themselves to provide such a government.  All the 
States had governments when the Constitution was adopted.  In all the people participated 
to some extent, through their representatives elected in the manner specifically provided.  
These governments the Constitution did not change.  They were accepted precisely as they 
were, and it is, therefore, to be presumed that they were such as it was the duty of the States 
to provide.  Thus we have unmistakable evidence of what was republican in form, within 
the meaning of that term as employed in the Constitution.”).  See also Josh Douglas, The 
Right to Vote Under State Constitutions  
29
 See Wiecek, supra note 18-19 (“Democracy, referring to a distinctive form of 
government, meant the direct, complete, and continuing control of the legislative and 
executive branches by the people as a whole…all but extreme conservatives by 1787 
conceded that a ‘democratic element’ was essential or at least unavoidable in the 
composition of state governments.”).   See also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona 
30
 This is similar to the nonretrogression analysis that the Court used to apply in cases 
brought under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.   
31
  
32
 (cite).  See also Anderson v. Celebrezze.   
33
  
34
 In determining the means-ends fit, the Court would utilize principles similar to those 
embodied by the nonretrogression analysis of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which 
captures the historical reality that voters have a reliance interest in broad participation in 
the mechanics of state level governance, and states have to come forward with compelling 
reasons for changing a rule if voters are worse off under the new rule.  (cite cases).  For 
example, as the analysis in Part III(B) shows, states have considerable authority to pass 
voter identification laws, but these laws can be unconstitutional if structured to 
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I.  REVISITING THE EQUAL PROTECTION ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
 
Until recently, commentators had taken as a given that the right to vote derived 
from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and were content 
with its dubious origins because the Court was willing to assess infringements of 
the right under strict scrutiny.
35
  This support has proven to be fatal as the 
conception of the right to vote as an equal protection fundamental interest, rather 
than as a fundamental right under related doctrines such as substantive due 
process,
36
 provided an opening for the Court to reduce its scrutiny of laws 
infringing on the right.  As this section will show, the equal protection principles 
underlying the Supreme Court’s voting jurisprudence are best applicable to 
presidential elections; when applied in other contexts, the Court oscillates between 
different conceptions of the right to vote because it lacks a clear theoretical 
foundation for understanding the value of a vote.
37
   
 
Scholars have grouped the Court’s approach into individual and structuralist 
theories of the right to vote in an attempt to understand the harm to individual 
voters and, in the process, illustrate the ill fit of the equal protection framework.
38
  
Here, I focus on two related theories—communitarian and protective theories of 
democracy—both of which do an excellent job of explaining the Court’s 
jurisprudence in the last four decades, but only one of which, the protective 
democracy theory, highlights the problems with the equal protection framework by 
                                                                                                                            
unreasonably constrict the electorate and leave voters worse off.  See also Barnett, supra 
note , at 11-16 (embracing a power-constraining approach to interpreting the Ninth 
Amendment in which courts interpret unenumerated rights by reference to the means-ends 
fit of the legislation in question rather than as the converse of delegated powers).    
35
 79 NCL Rev. 1345 
36
 Ira Lupo 
37
 See Dan Rodriguez, Got Theory?  See also Rick Pildes, What Kind of Right is “The 
Right To Vote”?, 93 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 43, 44 (2007) (“Not only does the right to vote 
protect several different core interests, but these interests are also qualitatively distinct.  Put 
in other terms, there is not one right to vote.  There is several.”) 
38
 See Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 Ind. L.J. 
1289, 1292 (arguing that the individual rights framework is appropriate for assessing the 
new vote denial cases, which deal with issues of who can vote rather than questions of how 
to aggregate votes to ensure fairness and equality among groups).  See also Richard L. 
Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr to Bush 
v. Gore 139, 154 (2003) (rejecting a structuralist approach to voting rights cases); Chad 
Flanders, How to Think About Voter Fraud (And Why), 41 Creighton L. Rev. 93, 150 
n.138 (2007) (siding with the “individualist” rather than the “structuralist” analysis of voter 
fraud controversies). 
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placing voting within the larger scheme of democratic governance,
39
 emphasizing 
the accountability of elected officials that is key is to the right to vote being able to 
function as a mechanism for popular sovereignty.
40
  Similar in some respects to 
aspects of the structuralists critique, theories of protective democracy 
conceptualize voting as a means to allow the citizenry to control the actions of 
their government when key liberties are threatened, and as a result, is closely 
related to the exercise of popular sovereignty.
41
  But the assessment is significantly 
                                                 
39
 See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 
Ind. L.J. 1289, 1292 (“The individual-rights- versus-state-interests doctrinal framework 
plainly was not capturing the real interests at stake on both sides of these cases. 
Structuralist scholars urged the Court to reorient its jurisprudence toward promoting the 
interests of the whole polity, framed in terms of democratic values: competitiveness, 
participation, “democratic contestation,” the disruption of “lockups,” and other indicia of a 
healthy democratic order.”) 
40
 See also Pildes, supra note , at 44 (arguing that the individualistic vs. group rights 
analysis should not be the starting point, but instead scholars should focus on the fact that 
“the right to vote protects several distinct interests [including] the expressive interest in 
equal protection standing that inheres to each citizen [as well as] the interests groups of 
citizens have in systems of election and representation that distribute political power 
‘fairly’ or ‘appropriately’ as between these various groups”).  There is a robust literature 
debating the shortcomings of the individual rights framework for conceptualizing the right 
to vote.  See, e.g., Guy-Uriel Charles; Joseph Fishkin; Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. 
Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 2276, 
2282 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American 
Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. 83, 84; Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, 
Why Voting Is Different, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1201, 1202-03 (1996); Pildes, supra note 19, at 
2544 n.133; Judith Reed, Sense and Nonsense: Standing in the Racial Districting Cases as a 
Window on the Supreme Court's View of the Right to Vote, 4 Mich. J. Race & L. 389, 432-
40 (1999); John R. Low-Beer, Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional 
Representation, 94 Yale L.J. 163, 164 (1984). But see Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. 
Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26 Rutgers L.J. 723, 734-35 (1995). See generally 
Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term - Comment: Eracing Democracy: The 
Voting Rights Cases, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 109 (1994).  Implicit in this debate is that the 
framework is inadequate for federal elections since as Heather Gerken has argued, 
representative government is premised on the assumption that “individuals can collaborate 
to elect a person to speak on their behalf.”  Gerken, supra note , at 1678.  There are 
different assumptions that undergird the right to vote in the state elections, where voters are 
directly involved in matters of governance and the accountability function of elections is 
salient.  See Part II, infra.   
41
 This discussion of protective and communitarian theories of voting builds on a 
wonderful article written by Jim Gardner, who persuasively illustrates how these theories 
apply to the Court’s conception of the right to vote.  See Gardner, supra note , at 901-02 
(“to seek to vote under…a theory [of protective democracy] is to seek the ability to protect 
one’s liberty by controlling the identity of officeholders and, indirectly, their actions”).  
There are a number of democratic theories that could provide a framework for 
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more pluralistic than that offered by structuralists because while it does not ignore 
the bottom line metrics such as the decline of competition, turnout, and overall 
levels of participation that drive the structuralist critique, these metrics are not 
dispositive.
 42
  Instead, this approach highlights the instrumental value of voting as 
a means of holding elected officials accountable to the sovereign authority of the 
people, but it does so from the baseline of assessing the levels of participation that 
the people have historically enjoyed in the state.
43
  It provides historical context for 
understanding when measures are truly “anti-democratic.”  In contrast, theories of 
communitarian democracy contend that voting as important because “it is the 
hallmark of full membership in the political community,” and this approach 
focuses on the message conveyed by extending or retracting voting rights from 
certain individuals.
44
 
 
The Court has fluctuated between these two theories because it has treated voting 
as both a right and a privilege, with cases decided in the 1960s as the high water 
mark for voting’s conception as a right, but subsequent decades seeing a retraction 
of the right.
45
  In 1966, the Court decided Harper v. Board of Elections and held 
that voting is a fundamental interest under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and as such, once the right to vote is extended, then it 
must be extended equally.
46
  Harper struck down a poll tax on the grounds that 
                                                                                                                            
understanding the right to vote in state elections.  See, e.g., David Held, Models of 
Democracy; C.B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy; Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Partial Constitution; James Fishkin, Deliberation by the People Themselves: 
Entry Points for the Public Voice, 12 Election L.J. 490, 490, (2014); Lani Guiner, More 
Democracy, 1995 U.Chi. L. Forum 1.  While a robust right to vote is certainly consistent 
with most of these theories, protective democracy accords best with the popular 
sovereignty origins of the right because it captures its unique status as one part right and 
one part power.   
42
 Cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New 
Pressures for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 Hastings Const. L.Q. 643, 675-
77 (2008); Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 631, 634, 657-58 
(2007). 
43
 See Part II, infra.  
44
 Id. at 902.  This is not “expressiveness” in the sense of voters using the ballot to 
communicate a message.  See Burdick v. Takushi; Doe v. Reed.  It is expressive in the 
message that is sent to the broader community about denying some residents access to the 
ballot.  
45
 See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (noting that there is “no litmus-
paper test for separating those restrictions that are valid from that there are invidious under 
the Equal Protection Clause…Decisions in this context…is very much a matter of degree, 
very much a matter of considering the facts and circumstances behind the law…”). 
46
 Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), overruling 
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937). 
DRAFT --NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR DISTRIBUTION 2/17/2014 7:11 PM 
12 POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY FOUNDATIONS [Vol. __:_ 
 
 
 
 
invidiously discriminated on the basis of wealth, marking a notable departure from 
a case decided just seven years earlier, Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of 
Elections, where the Court applied rational basis review to a state law requiring all 
individuals take a literacy test as a prerequisite to voting.
47
  Similarly, Reynolds v. 
Sims established that the states’ failure to reapportion their state legislative districts 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
malapportionment, like the poll tax at issue in Harper, unduly infringed the right to 
vote.  In so holding, the Court noted that, “the fundamental principle of 
representative government in this country is one of equal representation for equal 
numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of 
residence within a State.” 48   The Court then adopted a principle designed to 
prevent the vote dilution that had persisted through the states’ failure to redistrict: 
one person, one vote.
49
  Both Harper and Reynolds presented opportunities for the 
Court to intervene and address what it considered to be egregious abridgments of 
the right to vote.  These extremes did not require the Court to establish a baseline 
from which to adjudge the harm of malapportionment,
50
 or alternatively, an 
affirmative vision of state regulatory authority over elections.
51
         
 
Consequently, neither Harper nor Reynolds stand for the proposition that the right 
to vote in state elections has to exist, even if the corresponding right to vote in 
federal elections must exist.
52
  Rather, the Court focused on what the Constitution 
                                                 
47
 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
48
 Reynolds,  377 U.S. at 660-561.   
49
 Id. at 569 (“We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection 
Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be 
apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an individual's right to vote for state 
legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted 
when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.”). 
50
 See, e.g., Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitution: Into the Thorns 
of the Thicket, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 191 (1986) (observing that “it was the gerrymander 
[emerging through malapportionment] that led the Court to respond, not the population 
discrepancies in and of themselves. Had those discrepancies been random, operating to the 
detriment of rural interests and to the advantage of urban interests as often as the other way 
around, it is unlikely that these discrepancies would have generated sufficient concern to 
have induced the Court to enter the political thicket”).   
51
 See Lassiter, 360 U.S. at (“We do not suggest that any standards which a State 
desires to adopt may be required of voters,” but noting that “there is wide scope for 
exercise of its jurisdiction”). 
52
 Id. (“While the right to vote in federal elections is conferred by Art. I, § 2, of the 
Constitution, the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned.  It is 
argued that the right to vote in state elections is implicit, particularly by reason of the First 
Amendment and that it may not constitutionally be conditioned upon the payment of a tax 
or a fee.  We do not stop to canvass the relation between voting and political expression.”). 
DRAFT --NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR DISTRIBUTION 2/17/2014 7:11 PM 
13 POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY FOUNDATIONS [Vol. __:_ 
 
 
 
 
requires should states decide to extend the right of suffrage, a focus that ultimately 
did more harm than good as the Court has decreased its level of scrutiny of voting 
regulations in the years since Harper.
53
  Numerous scholars have criticized this 
turn, noting that the equal protection standard allows the Court to avoid the 
question of what voting requires.
54
  This standard also blurs the line between state 
and federal elections, which impacts not only the breadth of the state’s regulatory 
authority but also, conceptually, whether the right is mandatory or optional for 
state elections.
55
 The Court focuses on the relative burdens on the right to vote, 
defined by reference to community norms regarding political influence, against the 
backdrop that states enjoy plenary authority to structure state and federal elections, 
and it does so without a theoretical justification that adequately explains why any 
given regulation can be a “burden” because it has no affirmative theory of voting.56   
 
The absence of theory is palpable once one separates out the instrumental value of 
voting, which varies depending on the election at issue.  Given the size of the 
electorate in national elections, the vision of voting as based on a message of 
inclusion rather than a form of accountability is more compelling because the 
accountability function is diluted.
57
  At the state level, however, voting is the most 
effective way for citizens to express their sovereign authority, and in turn, protect 
their fundamental rights, from government invasion, consistent with the theory of 
protective democracy. As James Gardner has argued, a right to vote premised on 
this theory forces the Court to commit to a finite and clear conception of the right 
                                                 
53
 See Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of “Equal Protection of the Laws,” 
1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 421, 450 (“The equal protection clause was clearly not intended to 
include the right to vote.”). 
54
 See, e.g., Heather Gerken, The Right to An Undiluted Vote  
55
 See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona (holding that the National Voter 
Registration Act, passed under the Elections Clause, preempts a contrary state law, but 
noting in passing that Congress has no control over voter qualifications for state or federal 
elections).   
56
 Gardner, supra note , at 900 (noting that “[v]oting has no intrinsic value”).  See also 
Ira Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 981 
(1979). 
57
 In our 200 plus years history, there have only been four presidential elections 
decided by a margin of less than one percent of the popular vote.  In state elections, this is 
far more common.  See, e.g., http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/government-has-
to-make-voting-easier/2014/02/02/ae99345a-8875-11e3-916e-e01534b1e132_story.html.  
While this Article focuses on the accountability function of voting, this does not exclude 
the fact that there are other reasons why people vote.  See Fishkin, supra note , at 1336, 
1355 (eschewing the “rational choice model of [of voting that focuses on] one’s impact on 
an election outcome” in favor of a theory of voting that emphasizes the “dignity inhering in 
the idea that my vote counts just as yours counts-that I am, with respect to the right to vote, 
your equal.”). 
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to vote, hence its awkward turn to the Equal Protection Clause.
58
   Harper and 
Reynolds are cases that embrace a protective democracy theory of voting, designed 
to facilitate popular sovereignty by eliminating effective barriers to voting, yet it is 
the communitarian vision that has come to dominate the caselaw.
59
  For example, 
in Kramer v. Union Free School District, the Court held that the a childless 
stockbroker who lived with his parents could not be excluded from school board 
elections because the state had failed to tailor the statute to avoid unduly narrowing 
the scope of the relevant political community.
60
  To vote in school elections in that 
particular district, the statute required that individuals 1) own or lease taxable real 
estate in the district or 2) have children who are enrolled in district schools.  The 
Court found that the state had not, with any precision, limited the franchise to those 
“directly affected” or “primarily interested” in the school elections because the 
statute allowed many people who had, at best, a remote interest to vote in the 
elections at the expense of excluding “interested and informed residents.”61   
   
Scholars view Kramer as an extension of Harper’s strong conception of the right 
to vote as a fundamental interest,
62
 indicating that it too may have a foundation in 
protective democracy; nonetheless, it is difficult to view the plaintiff, Kramer, as 
suffering harm in the traditional sense given that he has no children and no taxable 
property in the district in which he desires vote.  His interest is fairly remote, but 
implicit in the opinion is that his “injury” is an expressive one, an indication to 
outsiders that he had been excluded from the political community unfairly, in lieu 
of other, less interested persons who could vote in the school board elections.
63
  
Thus, Kramer is best understood as reflecting a communitarian view of the right to 
vote, which trumps the protective democracy theory in this instance because of the 
inherent flexibility of the equal protection standard in assessing relative burdens.
64
     
                                                 
58
 Gardner, supra note , at 941 (“the inherent logic of a protective democracy-based 
voting rights claim forces the Court to do something that it has never wanted to do: commit 
itself to the principle that the Constitution creates a definite, judicially discernible structure 
for the exercise of popular political power. The reasons the Court has historically given for 
wanting to avoid this task go to its view of its own competence. Another reason, however, 
may well be that the Court wishes to avoid publicly pronouncing the unappealing 
conclusion that the Constitution provides Americans with a level of political influence that 
is not merely minimal, but unacceptable by contemporary standards of democratic self-
government.”). 
59
 Gardner, supra note , at 975. 
60
 395 U.S. 621 (1968) (“Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may 
participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the 
legitimacy of representative government.”). 
61
 Id. at 633. 
62
  
63
  
64
 Gardner, supra note , at (arguing that, because of the equal protection framework, 
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The judicial focus on the right to vote as an indicator of political inclusion, rather 
than as a means of vindicating sovereign power, does little to explain why one 
regulation may be a burden on the right to vote relative to others.
65
   
 
To understand this point, consider Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, where the 
Court held that individuals who resided in the police jurisdiction of Tuscaloosa, 
and therefore were subject to Tuscaloosa’s police and sanitary regulations, were 
properly excluded from voting in municipal elections because they lived outside 
city boundaries.
66
 The Court held that this was not disenfranchisement in any 
meaningful sense because the plaintiffs, although affected by the extraterritorial 
effect of municipal regulations, did not have a direct interest in participating in the 
elections since they did not physically reside in the Tuscaloosa’s geographical 
boundaries.
67
  Oddly, the Court’s sees voting in this context as instrumental, but in 
a very limited sense, where the only function of voting is to promote the political 
interests of those who are informed or directly affected, with very narrow view of 
who fits in either category.
68
  The expressive, communitarian notion of voting, so 
central to Kramer, is still relevant in Holt but it commanded a different outcome 
due to the narrowness with which the Court defined the political community.  The 
Court did not think that the exclusion of these voters sent any particular message 
since they are already excluded from the political community by virtue of 
geography.  The Court makes this assumption, even though the residents of Holt 
are subject to Tuscaloosa’s police and sanitary regulations, and arguably suffered 
more concrete injury than the 31-year-old childless stockbroker.
69
 Had it 
recognized the right’s popular sovereignty foundations, the Court would have 
                                                                                                                            
the Court has been more receptive to claims of voting that are communitarian rather than 
based on protective democracy).   
65
 Gardner (paren about baseline) 
66
 439 U.S. 60 (1978) 
67
 Id. at 68-69. 
68
 Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 330 (describing the Court’s “instrumental 
power” approach in voting cases which “allows states to disenfranchise in order to promote 
an “intelligent” electorate or to insure that voters have a direct stake (or “interest”) in the 
outcome. The underlying basis for such distinctions, while never explicitly articulated, is a 
notion that those who fail to meet the qualifications cannot define with specificity their 
policy choices in a rational and informed way and pursue such choices through voting”). 
69
 See Gardner, supra note , at 912 (“Compared to the plaintiffs in Holt, the plaintiff in 
Kramer had a far less plausible claim that his inability to vote impaired in any significant  
way his ability to protect his rights and liberties from government infringement.  The 
residents of Holt were subject to all manner of laws, including criminal and traffic offenses, 
made by Tuscaloosa officials. As a result, any claim by Kramer based on a theory of 
protective democracy would have had to rely on a far more attenuated connection between 
the actions of the school board and the plaintiff’s rights and interests than existed in 
Holt.”).  
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appreciated that the burden on Holt residents had little to do with geography.  The 
harm resulted from the deprivation of sovereign authority, which requires that the 
delegation of power to Tuscaloosa be contingent upon those subject to its laws 
retaining the right to vote as an accountability mechanism, even if those 
individuals reside outside city boundaries.
70
  Instead, the equal protection 
framework allowed the Court to rely on its own subjective perception of what 
constituted a burden, a result that often prioritizes the communitarian theory of the 
right to vote over the protective democracy view.
71
 
 
Despite the Court’s theoretical shortcomings, there is a role for equal protection 
principles to play in assessing the constitutionality of state electoral regulations. 
Implicit in the equal protection standard is the notion that the right to vote can be 
rescinded, a point that is consistent with communitarian notions that the value of 
the vote lies, not in its instrumental value, but in its signal that one is part of the 
political community.
72
  If the right is rescinded from everyone, then no one is 
“excluded” and therefore suffers a cognizable injury. 73  Moreover, if one looks at 
the history and the text of the Constitution, the only context in which the right to 
vote explicitly can be rescinded is in presidential elections, suggesting that its 
conception as an equal protection fundamental interest should be limited to that 
context.    
 
Bush v. Gore, which ended the Florida recount in the 2000 presidential election on 
equal protection grounds, is instructive here.
74
  The Florida Supreme Court had 
ordered a manual recount in all Florida counties where the undervotes had not been 
tabulated, but did not set standards for conducting the recount.
75
  Since the Florida 
Supreme Court did not establish uniform rules for determining voter intent in 
tabulating the undervotes, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the recount that had 
                                                 
70
 See Gardner, supra note , at 908-09 (“[T]he basis of the plaintiffs’ invocation of the 
right to vote is an almost paradigmatic expression of a theory of protective democracy. The 
plaintiffs did not contend that the police jurisdiction of Tuscaloosa could not be extended 
beyond its boundaries, but that it could not be so extended without a concomitant extension 
of the franchise….In other words, they did not want to be subjected to laws enacted by 
representatives whom they had no hand in choosing and over whom they exercised no 
effective control.”). 
71
 Gardner, supra note  (making this point). 
72
 See Harper 
73
 Gardner, supra note , at 973 (“The heart of a communitarian democracy claim is the 
contention that the government has given the plaintiff less than it has given others, a claim 
with obvious similarities to a prima facie claim of unequal treatment under equal protection 
principles.”). 
74
 531 U.S. 98 (2000).   
75
 Id. at 100.  The Florida Supreme Court also ordered a full recount in some counties, 
further compounding the equal protection problems.  Id. at 107-108. 
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the effect of “valu[ing] one person’s vote over another,” violating the Equal 
Protection Clause’s guarantee against “arbitrary and disparate treatment.”76  Like 
Reynolds v. Sims, the Court presented the core problem with the recount as one in 
which an individual’s vote either counts or is discarded by virtue of which county 
he resides in.
77
 Equal protection requires that states “value” votes equally, a 
standard that “extends beyond the initial allocation of the franchise.”78 Opening the 
door for an equal protection challenge to the nuts and bolts of election 
administration was arguably not the Court’s intent, given that the disparate 
counting of votes always exist in every election.  So either Bush v. Gore cannot 
mean what it says, hence the “ticket good for one day only” criticism that has 
followed the decision,
79
 or there is something unique about the presidential context 
that justifies a robust use of the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
80
 
 
While both of these premises suggest that the equal protection holding of Bush v. 
Gore does not apply to the nuts and bolts of election administration outside of the 
context of presidential elections, it is the latter point that is most relevant here in 
explaining why this might be the case.
81
 Notably, the Court did not hold that 
Florida may not vary the way in which it counts its ballots by county, or 
alternatively, that the mechanisms for counting votes in every election must ensure 
that every voter’s ballot is treated the same.82  Instead, the Court is upfront that this 
situation is unique precisely because it implicates Article II, section 1, which 
delegates to the states the authority to choose how electors are appointed.
83
  The 
fact that Bush v. Gore is an equal protection case is a bit of a fluke, an approach 
dictated by the Florida state legislature’s choice to extend the right to vote to its 
citizens rather than standing as any indication that the Court is embracing an 
affirmative vision of what the right to vote entails—protective democracy, 
                                                 
76
 Id. at 105  
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. at 104. 
79
 Karlan, supra note , at 1363 (referring to Bush v. Gore as a rare equal protection case 
in which the Court has “leveled down,” and the inequality is remedied by “depriving the 
previously included group” of the benefit by ending the recount); 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 757; 
68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 637; Klarman, 89 Cal. L. Rev. (2001).    
80
 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (making this 
point). 
81
 Cf. Ohio Cases using Bush v. Gore 
82
 See id.  See also id. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“We deal here not with an 
ordinary election, but with an election for the President of the United States.”); Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (“In the context of a Presidential election, state-imposed 
restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest.  For the President and the Vice 
President of the United States are the only elected officials who represent all the voters in 
the Nation.”). 
83
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communitarian, or otherwise.  Bush v. Gore signals the opposite, in fact.  The 
Court’s failure to hew to any one theory of voting is not immediately apparent, as 
it seems to endorse the same vision of voting from Kramer in finding that the state 
has to “value” votes equally, yet the Court’s failure to hold that Florida generally 
may not vary the way in which it counts its ballots by county, or alternatively, that 
the mechanisms for counting votes in every election must ensure that every voter’s 
ballot is treated the same, illustrate that the case is not of the same vein as 
Kramer.
84
  
 
In reality, the theoretical foundation of voting is less important in the context of a 
presidential election because it is the one situation in which the state can in fact 
rescind the right to vote;
85
 thus, equal protection makes sense as a framework for 
assessing the grounds that states have extended the franchise in this context 
because it is unique among constitutional provisions that govern the involvement 
of states in federal elections.
86
  The presidential context is one in which the right to 
vote, standing alone, is arguably not as robust as other circumstances because the 
states’ authority to deprive their citizens of this right is both historically and 
textually grounded, but once the right is extended, state regulations that curb it 
should be reviewed under strict scrutiny given the national interest at stake.
87
  Even 
if the right to vote is defined by state law, the scope of a national election as well 
as the discretion provided to the legislatures by the constitutional text undermines 
any possibility of an affirmative vision of the right to vote in this context;
88
 all that 
remains is a system of minimal entitlements defined by the efficacy of one vote vis 
a vis another.   
 
For this reason, it may be best to view the right to vote in the context of 
presidential elections as different, both descriptively and normatively, and 
therefore inappropriate for establishing the standards by which the Court 
                                                 
84
 See Karlan, supra note , at 1364 (arguing that Bush v. Gore is about structural equal 
protection, or the “perceived systemic interest in having recounts conducted according to a 
uniform standard” rather than vindicating “the interest of an identifiable individual voter”).  
85
 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (noting that “no federal constitutional right to vote for electors 
for the President of the United States”). 
86
 See McConnell, supra note , at 661 (noting that Article II, Section 1’s delegation to 
the legislatures of determining electors for presidential elections “puts the federal court in 
the awkward and unusual posture of having to determine for itself whether a state court's 
‘interpretation’ of state law is an authentic reading of the legislative will”). 
87
 See, e.g., http://lubbockonline.com/stories/120900/nat_120900078.shtml.  See also 
Michael McConnell, 68 U. Chi L. Rev. 657 By specifying "the Legislature" as the source 
of state law, [Article II, Section 1] departs from the usual principle of federal constitutional 
law, which allows the people of each state to determine for themselves how to allocate 
power among their state governing institutions.”).  
88
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determines whether the right to vote has been abridged.  In Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, the Court created the balancing test currently applied to regulations 
affecting the right to vote, but subsequently has ignored that the test was developed 
in the context of restrictive ballot access laws affecting candidates for the 
presidency.
89
  The Ohio law at issue in Anderson required independent candidate to 
declare their candidacy earlier than the nominees of the two major political parties.  
Even though the Court previously had upheld ballot access restrictions in order to 
promote the state’s interest in avoiding political fragmentation, it was “in the 
context of elections wholly within the boundaries” of the state. In contrast, the 
“State’s interest in regulating a nationwide presidential election is not nearly as 
strong.”90  Despite this language, there is no acknowledgment, as in Bush v. Gore, 
that presidential elections are different; instead, the Court has simply extended the 
balancing test to every electoral context, with no delineation of the election at 
issue.  Recently, in Crawford v. Marion County, the Court applied the Anderson 
balancing test to assess the burdens of a voter identification law on the right to 
vote, with no acknowledgment of the context in which the law was being applied.
91
  
Crawford struggled to reconcile Harper and Anderson, relegating strict scrutiny to 
“rational restrictions on the right to vote [that are] unrelated to voter qualifications” 
and reserving balancing for everything else.
92
  The problem is that the Court’s 
appropriation of equal protection analysis into the context of all elections, despite 
its limited use in those circumstances where the legislature has delegated its 
authority under article II, section 1 to choose presidential electors directly to the 
voters, has not stopped lower courts from applying a similar equal protection 
analysis to regulations of the right to vote across the board, no matter what the 
interests at stake or the election as issue.
93
 Using standards developed in the 
presidential context as precedents to assess electoral regulations in other, more 
pedestrian, contests obscures the harm of the regulation and minimizes the right 
that is at stake.  As the next section shows, the popular sovereignty foundations of 
the right to vote undermine the equal protection foundation that implies that states 
can rescind the right to vote at will, even for their own elections. 
    
                                                 
89
 460 U.S. 780.  Some might argue that this deference was unwarranted, even in the 
context of presidential elections.  See generally Gardner, supra note at 969 (“One of the 
earliest manifestations of a tension between the constitutional scheme and popular 
American beliefs about democracy was the almost immediate collapse of the electoral 
college. Intended to be a body of wise and virtuous citizens exercising independent 
judgment, it quickly devolved into a reliable conduit for the implementation, as nearly as 
possible within constitutional constraints, of a form of direct presidential election.”). 
90
  
91
  
92
 Crawford v. Marion County, 553 U.S. 181, 189 (2008).  See also Burdick v. Takushi 
93
 [cite cases].  See also Crawford v. Marion County 
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II.  THE RIGHT TO VOTE AS A POWER-RIGHT UNDER THE NINTH AND TENTH 
AMENDMENTS 
 
The Supreme Court conceives of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as textually 
based limits on the authority of the federal government,
94
 the Tenth Amendment in 
particular defined only by those portions of the Constitution that explicitly delegate 
power to each of the three branches and the Ninth rarely mentioned beyond the 
occasional concurring opinion.
95
  While this principle of a limited federal 
government has not been consistently adhered to, the last three decades has 
witnessed a revitalization of Tenth Amendment constraints on federal power, with 
the Court holding, for example, that Congress infringes on state sovereignty when 
it forces states to take title for radioactive waste generated within their borders;
96
 
stating that Congress cannot compel state officials to administer federal law;
97
 and 
requiring a clear statement from Congress before the Court will treat state 
legislation as preempted.
98
  Recently, the Court has expanded the sphere of Tenth 
Amendment enforcement to include individuals, holding in Bond v. United States 
that a person convicted under federal law can challenge their conviction on Tenth 
Amendment grounds.
99
   
 
Yet implicit in this jurisprudence is the assumption that only the states, and not 
individuals, have cognizable interests under the Tenth Amendment because the 
Court has assumed that, with respect to the constitutional structure, the interests of 
the people are perfectly aligned with those of the state.
100
  Even the Bond Court, 
which recognized that individuals “can assert injury from governmental action 
taken in excess of the authority that federalism defines” and that their rights “in 
this regard do not belong to the state,” would not go as far as to say that 
individuals have reserve “power” under the Tenth Amendment because such power 
does not translate easily into the rights/power framework with which we are 
accustomed.
101
  Thus, the decision to allow an individual to enforce the boundaries 
                                                 
94
  
95
 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton 
96
 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
97
 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
98
 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
99
 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011). 
100
 Probably the most famous iteration of the Ninth Amendment is in Justice 
Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut, although it has appeared from time to 
time.  See also Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion 
based in part on the Ninth Amendment).  
101
 Instead, the Court frames the liberty that individuals have under the Tenth 
Amendment as a derivative of the diffusion of the power between the two sovereigns. and 
aligns the individual’s interests with those of the state.  Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364. 
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of federalism became an issue of standing, rather than a reflection of the 
sovereignty that the people retain vis a vis their states.
102
 
 
Few, if any, scholars have probed whether the delineation in the Tenth Amendment 
of the powers that are “reserved to the states,” on one hand, or “to the people,” on 
the other, signify that the people have powers under the Tenth Amendment that are 
distinct and separate from the states, nor is there much discussion about how this 
authority can be furthered.
103
  While this Article does not weigh in on the broader 
debates surrounding which rights are protected by the Ninth Amendment,
 104
 it 
views the Ninth Amendment is an indispensible medium to facilitate the people’s 
Tenth Amendment sovereignty, as most scholars agree that the phrase “or to the 
people” in the Tenth Amendment concern the allocation of sovereignty rather than 
stand as a source of potential unenumerated rights.
105
   
 
Unlike the courts, the legal scholarship has exhibited more comfort with the idea 
that the people retain power, analyzing at length the extent to which popular 
sovereignty principles constrain governmental action.
106
  However, most of the 
debate has taken place within the framework of judicial supremacy, or whether the 
Supreme Court or the people have the final say about the meaning of the 
Constitution,
107
 with occasional discussion about how the people best express their 
                                                 
102
  
103
 See Lash, supra note , at 391-392 (arguing that the Ninth Amendment was intended 
to protect the power of the states, but not delineating between the interest of the states and 
those of the people).  Lash assumes that when the federal government exceeds its 
enumerated power, it encroaches on areas of law reserved to the states, presumably power 
that the states would exercise on behalf of the people.  Id 394 (“Madison conceived the 
Ninth Amendment in response to calls from state conventions that a provision be added 
limiting the constructive expansion of federal power into matters properly belonging under 
state control…A rule of construction guarding the retained rights of the people amounted to 
the same thing as limiting the power of the federal government to interfere with matters 
believed left to state control.”). 
104
 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1229, 1238 (noting that even during the debates 
contemporaneous to the adoption of the Ninth Amendment, there was not a consensus as to 
which rights were protected). 
105
 Massey, supra note at 1239. 
106
  See, e.g., 112 Harv. L. Rev. 434, 443 (1998) (arguing that, to the extent that the 
legitimacy of government hinges on popular consent, then “each person’s voice must be 
given equal weight” and “each person’s voice should be heard as fully and accurately as 
possible.”); Akhil Reed Amar & Alan Hirsch, For the People: What the Constitution Really 
Says About Your Rights 3-33 (using theory of popular sovereignty to argue that the 
Constitution can be changed through majority vote).     
107
 Larry Kramer has, most famously, pushed back against the widely accepted premise 
of judicial supremacy on popular sovereignty grounds, arguing that the Constitution is not 
ordinary law, “not peculiarly the stuff of courts and judges;” rather, it is “a special form of 
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sovereign will.
108
  Some scholars also study how popular sovereignty manifests 
itself procedurally within the Constitution’s framework,109 but most fail to give 
extended thought to how the Constitution preserves certain rights that derive 
almost entirely from state law in order to facilitate popular sovereignty.
110
   
 
A. The People’s Authority to Alter or Abolish Their State Governments 
as the Predecessor of the Right to Vote 
 
Under traditional political theory, as the sovereign, people could act collectively to 
abolish the government or alter it through violent means.
111 
 Scholars typically 
associate mob action as the purest expression of the people’s sovereign 
authority.
112
  The belief that the people could resist the government through extra-
constitutional mechanisms and by revising their constitutions without limit was 
based on a theory of inherent rights, and it was broader than the original right of 
revolution that prompted the war with Great Britain.
113
  Five of the eleven states 
that drafted constitutions in 1776 contained alter or abolish provisions,
114
 while 
others had amendment provisions similar to Article V.
115
   
                                                                                                                            
popular law, law made by the people to bind their governors.”  But see Larry Alexander & 
Lawrence B. Solum, Book Review: Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594, 
1640 (2005) (“Kramer has pushed the idea of popular sovereignty to its limit by embracing 
the idea of constitutional interpretation by mob…it seems clear that, in its purest form, 
popular constitutionalism is about as unattractive as a constitutional theory could possibly 
be”). 
108
 For notable examples, see Fritz; Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech: The People’s 
Darling Privilege: Struggles for Freedom of Expression in American History   
109
 8 Seton Hall Const. L. J. 363, 412 (1998) (arguing that the Constitution limits the 
use of supermajority requirements “to instances that would reinforce popular sovereignty”). 
110
  
111
 Fritz at 17.  Because the people retained the ability to abolish their state 
governments, this is why the authority of the people and the power of the states treated, in 
most respects, as identical. Lash, supra note , at 394.  This assumption was also driven in 
part by a view of the Founding generation that the states were too democratic and too 
reflective of the desires of the citizentry; given this link, it made sense for the framers to 
equate, as Kurt Lash argues, the “prerogatives of the people with the autonomy of the 
states.”  Id 
112
 Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 
4, 27 (2000) (“Mobbing was an accepted, if not exactly admired, form of political action - 
common in England and on the Continent as well as in America.  Mob action represented a 
direct expression of popular sovereignty, justified as a last resort by the writings of Grotius, 
Puffendorf, and Locke, not to mention long tradition.”). 
113
 Id. at 22. 
114
 DINAN, SUPRA note ; FRITZ, SUPRA note , at 24. 
115
 See generally Amar, supra note , at 487 (noting that various states had 
constitutional clauses that looked like Article V, but arguing that these “Article V 
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As Christian Fitz has argued, there were competing views at the Founding about 
how the power to alter or abolish government should be domesticated from its 
violent, British origins: that the “collective sovereign expressed its will only 
through the use of procedural mechanism,” or alternatively, “collective sovereignty 
meant that ‘the people’ could express their will directly…without using formal 
procedures.”116  These competing strands took root at different levels of 
government, with the federal government utilizing Article V as its own unique 
version of the alter or abolish theory popularized by the Revolutionary War.
117
  In 
contrast, state governments were not as formalistic, initially allowing the people 
significant authority to revise their state constitutions at will,
118
 but by the Civil 
War, facilitating this authority through individual rights that allowed the people to 
control the composition of government. 
 
1. Article V and Alter or Abolish at the Federal Level  
 
The Constitution of 1787 is an attempt to tie the expansive authority of the new 
government to the most credible source, the “sovereign” people, but without the 
chaos that had accompanied popular sovereignty at the state level.
119
  In trying to 
                                                                                                                            
analogues were not…as exclusive” and “the polity had retained the legal right to alter or 
abolish outside these analogues by simple majority vote”).   
116
 Id. at 268. 
117
 See Fitz, supra note , at 25 (describing the alter or abolish principle that came out of 
the Revolutionary War as one that gave the people authority “to revise their constitutions 
without limit”).  See also Brannon Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional 
Change, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 155, 178 ( ) (“Article V can be seen as the Constitution writ 
small [because] [i]t affirms the right of the people to alter or abolish their 
government…[but] the institutional procedures and supermajority requirements help 
guarantee that reason and not passion guide the sovereign people”). 
118
 See Fitz, supra note , at 30 (“Americans routinely revised their constitutions by 
citing the people’s inherent right as the sovereign to change their minds.”).  See also Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131 (1991) (arguing that 
the right of assembly and petition are “an express reservation of the collective right of We 
the People to assemble in a future convention and exercise our sovereign right to alter or 
abolish our government by a simple majority vote”).  See Dinan, supra note , at3 (“the 
drafters of the federal Constitution established a rigid amendment and revision process, 
[but] state convention delegates have almost uniformly rejected this approach and adopted 
relatively flexible procedures for constitutional change.”). 
119
 2 Farrand, supra note , at 88 (Madison’s characterization of the Legislatures that 
would ratify the Constitution as “mere creatures of their State Constitutions” and were no 
“greater than their creators [the people],” arguably helped to legitimize the Constitution’s 
requirement that it be ratified by three-fourths of state conventions as having a basis in 
popular sovereignty). 
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determine how government can be based on a fairly narrow conception of “the 
consent of the governed,” the framers created a structure that both embraced and 
rejected certain beliefs about the nature of popular sovereignty.  The new 
government was not a wholesale rejection of the form of popular sovereignty that 
was implicit in the Articles—that the authenticity of the people finds its best 
expression through the filter of state government, but now this interest would be 
represented in the Senate.  Instead, the radicalism emerged in the Constitution’s 
acknowledgment that there will be times when the views of the state and those of 
its residents will diverge, dissent that can be expressed in part by members of the 
House who represent smaller, more geographically compact constituencies.
120
  
Thus, the Constitution emphasizes localism by preserving a significant amount of 
the state sovereignty that existed under the Articles of Confederation, but it also 
recognizes that the people themselves retain both rights and powers with which 
they entered the new union.  The delegation of powers and rights directly to the 
people and structurally through the house legitimated the more powerful national 
government because its responsibilities no longer ran solely to the states.
121
   
 
The idea that the people would continue to have considerable control at the state 
level ultimately validated the form of government created by the framers, where 
the people could only act through the filter of their state governments or, 
alternatively, through their representatives.
122
 Undoubtedly, many of the framers 
viewed democracy as inconsistent with the protection of property rights, and 
rationalized that narrow access to the franchise and governance by elites was 
                                                 
120
 See generally Morgan, supre note , at 83 (discussing the “fiction” of popular 
sovereignty in seventeenth century England where, with respect to Parliament, there was 
“no distinction between sovereign and subject, and in the absence of any higher expression 
of popular will, could endow an existing government with absolute and arbitrary powers”).  
121
 WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, SUPRA note , at 31 (“In addition to correcting the 
deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution was intended to restrain the 
excesses of democracy and protect minority rights from overbearing majorities in the state 
legislatures.”).   
122
 See Amar, supra note , at 1436 (“As sovereign, the People need not wield day-to-
day power themselves, but could act through agents on whom they conferred limited 
powers. Within the sphere of these delegated powers, government agents could legitimately 
compel obedience in the name of their sovereign principal, but those agents lacked 
authority to go beyond the scope of their agency. So long as the People at all times retained 
the ability to revoke or modify their delegations, such agency relationships were in no 
sense a surrender or division of ultimate sovereignty.”). But see Henry Monaghan, We the 
People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 
121 (1996) (criticizing Amar for overlooking “the democracy restraining nature of the 
Constitution” in trying to draw parallels between Article V and the traditional 
understanding of the alter or abolish power). 
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necessary to minimize this risk.
123
 The framers hoped to escape the sometimes 
chaotic and unwieldy democratic governance that existed at the state level, where 
assemblies were elected under popular suffrage and contained officials from all 
walks of life, the antithesis of the governance by landed gentry that many framers 
preferred.
124
  The early days of the Republic reinforced this sense that a “natural” 
aristocracy, led by elites, was the key to the success of representative democracy, 
where the interests of the people would be adequately represented by reasoned and 
learned gentlemen who govern through consensus rather than by faction.
125
  
 
Learning from past mistakes, the framers provided that if the people wanted to 
amend the Constitution or otherwise change their government, the remedy lies in 
Article V’s amendment process, or alternatively, frequent elections.126 In limiting 
the ability of the people to amend the new constitution, the framers repudiated old 
notions of government as based on a virtually unbreakable contract between the 
people and an equal or superior sovereign; now, the people are sovereign and 
government is subordinate subject to the caveat that the people are limited in how 
they can exercise their sovereignty.
127
  Consistent with this, the Article V 
amendment process prevented the direct involvement by the people in amending 
the Constitution: amendments have to be proposed by two-thirds of both Houses of 
Congress, or two-thirds of the states have to call a convention for proposing 
amendments.
128
  Under the Constitution, the people as sovereign agreed to be 
bound, not only by its substantive mandates, but also the mechanisms by which it 
could be altered.
129
   
                                                 
123
 Federalist No. 10 (“Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of 
turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the 
rights of property; and having general been as short in their lives as they have been violent 
in their deaths.”).  There were some exceptions.  See Keyssar, supra note , at 12).   
124
 Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics 7-9 (1965) (noting that “the 
political background and deeper context of the Revolution lie in the ‘rise of the assemblies’ 
in America, from their rudimentary origins to the status of full-fledged legislatures 
incapable of simple subordination to external political forces”).   See also Federalist Papers 
No. 10 (“Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government 
[democracy], have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to perfect equality in 
their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in 
their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.”). 
125
 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote 8 (“The planters, merchants and prosperous 
farmers who wielded power and influence in late-eighteenth-century affairs had an 
unmistakable interest in keeping the franchise narrow: a restricted suffrage would make it 
easier for them to retain their economic and social advantages.”). 
126
 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
127
 FRITZ, SUPRA note , at 21-22. 
128
 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
129
 “After creating governments based on their authority as the sovereign, the people 
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Given this, it is not surprising that there is no mechanism for direct democracy at 
the federal level,
130
 as well as no alter or abolish power that correlated to that 
which existed at the state level. Splitting the atom of sovereignty allowed the 
framers to use popular sovereignty as a principle that validated the new powers of 
the national government, 
131
 while preserving “true” popular rule and 
majoritarianism for the people in the states.
132
 This structure was consistent with 
the view of the role of government shared by most people in the 1780s.  As Jack 
Rakove observed,  
For most Americans, indeed, national politics mattered little…When 
Americans thought about politics at all, they directed their concerns 
                                                                                                                            
were henceforth bound by their constitutions.  Under this view, the written constitution and 
the government it created were the only channels through which the sovereign’s will could 
be recognized.”  FRITZ, SUPRA note, at 21 (citing Chisholm v. Georgia).  See also Amar, 
supra note , at 1441 (arguing that only direct ratification by the people in convention could 
limit state governments). 
130
 See Amar, supra note , at 460 (describing Article V as “minoritarian…[p]recisely 
because ordinary Government is distrusted”).  See also Fritz, supra note , at 135 (“The 
federal framers did not include alter or abolish language in the federal Constitution.  
Moreover, they rejected the assumption that the sovereign source creating the constitution 
retained an inherent right of revision.  The framers’ position dramatically departed from an 
expansive view of the people’s sovereignty.”).  There is an open question of whether direct 
democracy violates the Guarantee Clause, a question that the Court has avoided as a 
political question.  See Pacific States.  If I am correct, that the Clause is one of minimal 
entitlements as opposed to a direct reflection of how state government must be structured, 
then arguably, direct democracy is constitutional.  See Part , infra.  
131
 Our constitution is based on the idea of sovereignty lying in the people, that “people 
made a government legitimate or illegitimate by withdrawing their support.” FRITZ, SUPRA 
note , at 16. 
132
 See also The Federalist No. 32 (arguing that “the State governments would clearly 
retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not…exclusively 
delegated to the United States”); The Federalist No. 39 (noting that the states possess “a 
residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.”).  See also CASS SUNSTEIN, 
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 21 (1993): 
[The framers] attempted to carry forward the classical republican belief in virtue—a 
word that appears throughout the period—but to do so in a way that responded 
realistically, not romantically, to likely difficulties in the real world of political life.  
They continued to insist on the possibility of virtuous politics…[but] tried to make a 
government that would create such politics without indulging unrealistic assumptions 
about human nature.  We might understand the Constitution as a complex set of 
precommitment strategies, through which the citizenry creates institutional 
arrangements to protect against political self-interest, factionalism, failures in 
representation, myopia, and other predictable problems in democratic governance. 
Id. 
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toward local and state issues.  These were the levels of governance whose 
decisions affected their daily lives, and which had to cope with the 
aftermath of a prolonged revolutionary struggled that had placed so 
enormous a strain on American society.
133
 
Robustly democratic states and a far less majoritarian federal government also 
validated the idea that a Republic can exist in a country the size of the United 
States.
134
  The framers believed that the American experiment could be successful 
in protecting individual liberties by playing the two, very different, sovereigns 
against each other.
135
    
 
Thus, populism is notably absent from federal elections, as they were never 
intended to be democratic in any meaningful sense.  For example, the electors (not 
voters) participating in the first and second presidential elections unanimously 
selected George Washington to be president,
136
 and three of the next five 
presidents after Washington were all be from Virginia’s wealthy planter class, and 
two of the five were a wealthy father-son duo from Massachusetts.  The absence of 
an affirmative federal right to vote contributed to this state of affairs because many 
of the framers also were against the Constitution itself imposing suffrage 
requirements for participation in House elections, utilizing voting as a means to 
link the fortunes of the state and federal governments together, rather than as a 
vehicle that could accurately convey the collective will of the people.
137
  The 
                                                 
133
 RAKOVE, SUPRA note , at 28.  See also Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage 
from Property to Democracy 1760-1860 42 (1960) (making a similar point). 
134
 Allison La Croix; Toqueville  
135
 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). In Gregory, the Supreme Court 
argued that the “federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous 
advantages”: 
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse 
needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement 
in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in 
government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in 
competition for a mobile citizenry. 
Id. See also John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 399, 433 (2010) (describing the Constitution as “a complex effort to reconcile 
competing values about the appropriate sphere of state authority” and describing one value 
as the “value of federalism” and the other as “that of a stronger, more effective natural 
government.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 
47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (1994) (describing federalism based on different conceptions 
of the state). 
136
 A. James Reichley, The Life of the Parties 29, 34 (1992). 
137
 The Federalist No. 57.  The full quote is: “Who are to be the electors of the federal 
representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; 
not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humbles sons of obscure and 
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framers were aware of the potential pitfalls that accompanied popular suffrage, and 
tried to control for it by, for example, delegating to each house of Congress the 
power to be the “Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own 
members,”138 given Congress the authority to set aside the election of even the 
most democratically elected representative.  Likewise, Article I, section 2 states 
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen “by the 
People of the several States,” but it delegates to states the responsibility of 
choosing the qualifications of the electors.
139
  So presumably the people still 
“choose” their representatives, but this provision allowed states to exclude 
individuals from the franchise based on any number of criteria including wealth, 
crime, age, race, and gender.  This illustrated that, at least for federal elections, the 
people do not have the final say over the composition of Congress.
140
  The framers 
did not impose a similar requirement on the states, choosing only to impose a 
minimum requirement of republicanism in recognition of the value that comes in 
having a diversity of governing approaches as a means for effectuating the popular 
will. 
 
2. The Guarantee Clause and Expanded Suffrage as Constraints on 
the Alter or Abolish Power in the States 
 
The limited field of presidential candidates at the national level was inconsistent 
with the broad authority that the people had to nominate their candidates of choice 
for their own state legislatures.  By allowing the people to directly control the 
composition of government with very few structural checks like those that existed 
for federal elections,
141
 the franchise evolved into a suitable replacement for the 
people’s natural law right to alter or abolish government.  The search for a 
replacement was prompted by the Constitution’s ratification in 1789, but this 
evolution actually started occurring much earlier in the founding era.  Unlike the 
federal government, the suspicion of popular sovereignty did not manifest into 
structural changes that would dilute, or minimize this authority; instead, the post-
revolutionary era saw not-so-subtle changes in the ability of the people to alter or 
abolish their governments.  For example, the state that later became Vermont 
attempted to break away from New York in 1777, relying on the alter or abolish 
                                                                                                                            
unpropitious fortune.  The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United 
States.”  Id. 
138
  
139
 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 2. 
140
 Chafetz, supra note , at 170.  See also Franita Tolson, Congress’s Authority to 
Enforce Voting Rights after Shelby County and Arizona Inter Tribal (manuscript on file 
with the author).  
141
 See, e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 5; the Elections Clause; Art. II, Sec. 1. 
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power, but congressional leaders rejected this attempt as “untenable.”142  Many 
state leaders agreed, but did not want to (and did not believe they had the authority 
to) abolish the alter or abolish power outright.  Many post-1776 state constitutions 
circumscribed this authority by adding mechanisms by which state constitutions 
could be formally amended,
143
 and also, by providing the people with more power 
at the polls, first in deciding who can be nominated and later in expanding who can 
vote.   
 
The adoption of the Guarantee Clause in 1787 formally necessitated changes to the 
natural right to alter or abolish government.  The requirement of republicanism, 
although ill-defined during the founding era,
 144
 circumscribed the alter or abolish 
authority by rejecting the violence that had accompanied exercise of this power.
145
  
Some framers believed that the object of the Clause was “merely to secure the 
States against dangerous commotions, insurrections and rebellions.” 146   Others 
were against having a Guarantee Clause at all, believing that it would “perpetuat[e] 
the existing Constitutions of the states,”147 tapping into the fear of democracy that 
had prompted the structure of the federal government.  Notably, Edmund Randolph 
proposed an amendment, seconded by James Madison, that would have included 
the words “and that no state be at liberty to form any other than a Republican 
Government,” but both Randolph and Madison withdrew the amendment and the 
second in favor of the language “that a Republican form of Government shall be 
                                                 
142
 Fritz, supra note , at 55 (noting that “Americans could ‘alter or abolish’ their 
governments but congressional leaders faced a quandary” because “maintaining the status 
quo of newly established American governments was a more pressing concern than 
extending the logic of the Revolution’s principles that might challenge those 
governments.”). 
143
 Fritz, supra note , at 242 (“With one exception, every state between 1820 and 1842 
holding a constitutional convention inserted a provision for amendment if one did not 
already exist in its constitution”).       
144
 As William Wiecek noted in his seminal study of the Clause, there was very little 
consensus about what the Guarantee Clause of Article IV actually requires.  Wiecek, supra 
note , at 13 (“If the word [Republican] did have a definable meaning it probably had 
several, and they may have been vague, ambiguous, multifarious, or conflicting…a 
republic might have been the antithesis of a monarchy or an aristocracy, yet [John] Adams 
and others found no difficulty in imagining monarchic or aristocratic republics.  Some of 
the framers and their contemporaries expected the concept of republican government to 
change over time, hopefully perfecting the experiment begun by the Revolution.”). 
145
 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) (“In the case of an insurrection against a 
state or the government thereof, the President is to interfere”). 
146
 Debates 280 (comments of Wilson). 
147
 Debates 281 (comments of Houston) (noting that the “Georgia [constitution] was a 
very bad one”).  
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guaranteed to each State and that each State shall be protected against foreign and 
domestic violence.”148   
 
Given the rejection of language that arguably would limit states to governments 
that are Republican in nature, it is plausible that the alter or abolish power, 
although different in kind from the power that existed during the revolutionary era, 
has to be interpreted in light of the flexibility that the states retain in structuring 
their governments in accordance with the Clause. Arguably, republicanism 
requires some level of citizen participation, further validating the turn in the alter 
or abolish power from one centered in violence to one consisting of political 
rights.
149
  As Roger Sherman argued during founding era debates about the 
Clause’s meaning, a republican government is one that has three branches of 
government, including legislative and executive branches determined “by 
periodical elections, agreeable to an established constitution; and that what 
especially denominates it a republic is its dependence on the public or the people at 
large, without hereditary powers. 
150
  The “floor” of republicanism is not certain,151 
and besides the likely prohibition of a pure monarchy at the state level, Congress 
has used its authority under the Clause to suspend southern governments that 
deprived African-Americans of civil and political rights post-Reconstruction as 
nonrepublican in form.
152
  Functionally, this means that state governments could 
                                                 
148
 Debates 281. 
149
 Countless law review articles have been written on what constitutes a republican 
form of government, and many agree that republicanism requires that states extend political 
rights to their citizens.  See, e.g., Fred O. Smith, Jr., Awakening the People’s Giant: 
Sovereign Immunity and the Constitution’s Republican Commitment, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1941 (2012); Hans A. Linde, Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 65 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 709 (1994); Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 
4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1962).   
150
 Roger Sherman to John Adams, July 20, 1789, reprinted in Adams, ed., Work of 
Adams VI, 437.  See also Fed. 39, defining a republican government as: 
[A] government which derives all of its powers directly or indirectly from the great 
body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices during 
pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior.   
Id.  See also Wiecek, supra note , at 7 (“The negative senses of ‘republican’ that is 
nonmonarchical and nonaristocratic commanded the assent of most Americans in 1787.  
Beyond this it is unsafe to generalize about the precise meaning of the term.”).   
151
 See Sanford Levinson, Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of 
Governance 102 (2012) (discussing the broadening of the franchise over time as “part of 
the ‘living Constitution’” and noting that “[t]he fact that what was perfectly acceptable in 
1788 or even 1888 is certainly unacceptable today suggests that any scholarly analysis of 
‘republican govenrment’ in American political life must necessarily be part of what I 
earlier called the ‘narrative of change’”).  
152
 See Military Reconstruction Act; Wiecek 12 (“Nearly all Americans were certain 
that they wanted no monarchy in either the state or federal governments.”).  See also 
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radically defer from the representative nature of the federal government, and 
citizens can tie the legitimacy of their state governments directly to their ability to 
participate in its electoral processes.
153
   
 
Notably, this turn away from the more violent alter or abolish power, though a 
firmly entrenched natural right,
154
 corresponded to discussions in the eighteenth 
century about whether voting was a natural right.  As Alexander Keyssar argued in 
his seminal study, “The idea that voting was a right, even a natural right, had 
become increasingly widespread in the eighteenth century (its ancestry dated to 
antiquity) and was embraced by many small farmers and artisans, as well as by the 
most radical leaders of the revolution such as Franklin, Thomas Young of 
Pennsylvania, and Ethan Allen of Vermont.”155  While the concept of voting as a 
natural right did not become the dominant view,
156
 these discussions elevated its 
importance as a mechanism for protecting other natural rights such as the alter or 
abolish power.  Voting, along with the rights of assembly and petition, became the 
ideal theoretical foundations for reworking and reformulating the alter or abolish 
power.
157
  It also provided an answer to the perplexing question of “how the people 
act as one, like a traditional sovereign” at the state level, an answer that varied 
                                                                                                                            
Debates in the Federal Convention 281 (comments of Ghorum) (arguing that the Guarantee 
Clause is essential because “an enterprising citizen might erect the standard of monarchy in 
a particular state”). 
153
 See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism 
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (arguing that “the states cannot enjoy 
republican governments unless they retain sufficient autonomy to establish and maintain 
their own forms of government”).  See also Gardner, supra note , at 961 (“Although states 
are apparently free to provide more opportunities for self-protection through democratic 
institutions than the [Guarantee] clause requires, they need not provide much if they so 
choose.”).  
154
 Declaration of Independence.  See also Alabama Constitution of 1819 (referring to 
the alter or abolish power as “an unalienable, and indefeasible right”); Miss. Const. art. I, § 
2 (1832) (same). 
155
 Keyssar, supra note , at 12. 
156
 The Supreme Court implicitly rejected this argument in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 
(1849), which is famous for its holding that the power to determine whether a state 
government has been lawfully established is a political question, but also challenged the 
suffrage provisions of the Rhode Island Constitution on the grounds that the property 
requirements excluded half the state’s population of white males from voting.    
157
 See Christian Fritz, Recovering the Lost Worlds of Americas Written Constitutions, 
68 Alb. L. Rev. 261 (2005).  See also Kramer, supra note , at 25 (arguing that 
“unconstitutional laws could be resisted by community members who continued to profess 
loyalty to the government” and “[m]eans of correction and forms of resistence were well 
established and highly structured.  First and foremost, was the right to vote…[n]ext in 
importane, though perhaps not effectiveness, was the right to petitution….[and] the newly 
emerging right of assembly”). 
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from how the authority manifested with respect to the federal government without 
violence.
158
 Arguably, the use of voting as a means to facilitate the sovereignty of 
the people contributed to the speed with which states broadened voter base.
159
   
 
It is not until the post-Civil War era that the voting-as-natural-right debate would 
pick up steam again, yet states expanded suffrage in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, despite the lack of a firm basis in natural rights theory.
160
  This change 
was driven in part because of a shrinking electorate,
161
 and the expansion of the 
voter base also was a foreseeable consequence of granting the people broad 
authority to choose which individuals would actually be on the ballot.
162
  While 
many states retained freehold requirements for voters,
163
 at least initially, state 
officials were quite liberal in allowing the public to play a substantial role in 
choosing who could run for office in both state and federal elections. For example, 
New Jersey law provided that “it shall be lawful for every Inhabitant of this State, 
who is or shall be qualified to vote for Members of the State Legislature, to 
nominate four Candidates to the Choice of the People, as Representatives in the 
said Congress of the United States, by writing on one Ticket or Piece of Paper the 
Names of four Persons…at least thirty Days previous to the Day of Election….”164  
 
Similarly, New York election law divided the state into six districts, and gave the 
people in each district the authority to elect one representative without articulating 
any constraints on who could be nominated outside of those criteria specifically 
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.
165
  Connecticut likewise provided that “each 
                                                 
158
 Fritz, supra note , at 268.  See also John Adams, Diary Notes on the Right of Juries, 
Feb. 12, 1771, in L. Kinvon Wroth, et al., eds., Legal Papers of John Adams 228-29 (1965) 
(describing voting as “the Part which the People are by the Constitution appointed to take, 
in the passing and Execution of the Laws”). 
159
 Kramer, supra note , at 109 (noting that citizen demands to “control the course of 
government” was reflected in “expanded suffrage and higher voter turnout”). 
160
 See Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage from Property to Democracy 1760-
1860 (1960). 
161
  
162
 Numerous scholars have noted the connection between who can be on the ballot 
and who can participate in the election, see e.g., 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643; but there is also the 
more practical concern that it is difficult for the state to allow anyone to be a candidate 
while circumscribing that candidate’s support amongst the electorate.   
163
 See, e.g,, id. at 365 (quoting freehold requirements in the 1787 New York 
Constitution).   
164
 Gordon DenBoer et al., eds., The First Federal Elections 1788-1790, Vol. III 16 
(1986).   
165
 Id. at 361.  See also Gordon DenBoer et al., eds., The First Federal Elections 1788-
1790, Vol. III 362 (1986) (New York Constitution provides that “all such Elections [for 
Representatives of the Congress] shall be held and conducted by such Persons and in the 
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[Freeman shall] give his Votes or Suffrages for a number not exceeding twelve 
Persons whom he Judges Qualified to stand in nomination for Representatives of 
the People of this State to the Congress of the United States”166 while Delaware 
allowed voters to name “two persons” for their one congressional seat, subject only 
to the limitation that “one of whom at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same 
County with themselves.”167  Virginia, in contrast, was one of the more restrictive 
states and allowed voters to name one person for the office so long as that person is 
“a freeholder and…a bona fide resident for twelve months.”168 
 
The initial assumption in allowing voters to freely name their candidates was that 
they would pull from the same pool of distinguished individuals; nonetheless, the 
virtually unfettered ability to nominate candidates “of the people,” once conceived 
as an aspect of the people’s sovereign authority,169 made the slide toward liberal 
access to the ballot inevitable.   The change was gradual at first – with Delaware 
eliminating its property qualification for voting in 1792 and Maryland right after 
the turn of the century.
170
  Then, Massachusetts and New York allowed more 
liberal access to the ballot in the 1820s and Virginia and North Carolina in the 
1850s.
171
  Similarly, between 1830 and 1855, six states abolished the poll tax.
172
  
Notably, as Alexander Keyssar has observed, “none of the new states admitted to 
the union after 1790 adopted mandatory property requirements in their original 
constitutions.”173  In turn, state legislatures compelled municipalities to adopt more 
liberal voting regulations for local elections, leading to a convergence between 
state and local regulations that governed voter qualifications by 1855. 
 
                                                                                                                            
same manner as the Elections for Members of the Assembly of this State are by Law to be 
held and conducted”). Gordon DenBoer et al., eds., The First Federal Elections 1788-1790, 
Vol. II 70 (1984) (same for Delaware); id. at 290 (same for Virginia). 
166
 Gordon DenBoer et al., eds., The First Federal Elections 1788-1790, Vol. II 24 
(1984). 
167
 Id. at 71. 
168
 Id. at 294. 
169
 See, e.g., Roderick Hills, A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal 
Congressional Terms, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 97, 124 (1992) (defending the ability of state 
citizens to add qualifications for federal legislators as an aspect of popular sovereignty).   
170
 Keyssar, supra note , at 29. 
171
 Id.  
172
 Id. See also Kramer, supra note , at 191 (noting that “wealth restrictions on voting 
by white men were abandoned in many states even before the 1820s, and other majority-
restrictive devices were similarly replaced during these years.  By the time of Andrew 
Jackson’s first election in 1828, significant property or tax-paying requirements for voting 
existed in no more than two or three states, and only in South Carolina were presidential 
electors not popularly chosen”).   
173
 Keyssar, supra note ,  at 29. 
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The expansion of the franchise coincided with the rise of mass political parties in 
the 1820s, which underscored the view that political rights could express the 
people’s sovereign authority and reinforced the ability of these rights to serve as a 
replacement for the more robust alter or abolish power.
174
  The increasing 
competition between the political parties, and the corresponding increase in the 
adult male population who could not meet the property requirements instituted by 
most states in order to vote, motivated additional suffrage reform, which had 
become a partisan political issue.
175
  In turn, these reforms led to the election of 
more populous candidates such as Andrew Jackson, who ended the reign of the 
Founding-era aristocracy.
176
  Over the next several decades, the right of the people 
to alter and abolish their governments “became domesticated and evolved” in each 
of the colonies, where “[b]allots would replace bullets.”177  During the Civil War 
era, the people’s ability to alter or abolish their state governments officially moved 
from a power grounded in violence to one that involved changing government 
through democratic means, bringing full circle the connection between voting and 
the alter or abolish power as vehicles of sovereign expression.
178
   
 
B.  Cementing a New Understanding of Alter or Abolish: The Civil War and 
Reconstruction Era State Constitutions 
 
As the prior section shows, the adoption of the Guarantee Clause made it doubtful 
that the right of revolution that was exercised in 1776 could ever be justified.
179
  
This premise would not be tested until the Civil War, the exigencies of which 
                                                 
174
 Dinan, supra note , at 144 (noting that “Constitution makers during this period came 
under pressure to eliminate any distinctions grounded in property holdings”). 
175
 Keyssar, supra note 34-36.  Chilton, supra note , at 260. 
176
 Chilton, supra note , at 223 (noting that upon Jackson’s 1829 inauguration, “only 
two of the states comprising that section of the country where had been born required a 
freehold qualification for voting in any elections, North Carolina and Virginia”).  See 
Kramer, supra note , at 191 (noting that “wealth restrictions on voting by white men were 
abandoned in many states even before the 1820s” and “[b]y the time of Andrew Jackson’s 
first election in 1828, significant property or tax-paying requirements for voting existed in 
no more than two or three states”). 
177
 Amar, supra note , at 464. 
178
 See Akhil Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside 
Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 458 (1994) (arguing that “popular sovereignty principles 
in America [had] evolved beyond the Lockean core of the Declaration and established the 
legal right of the polity to alter or abolish their government at any time and for any reason, 
by a peaceful and simple majoritarian process”).  See also Fritz, supra note , at 124-126 
(discussing debates in 1787 about whether the alter or abolish provision in the Maryland 
Constitution, which described all government officials “as trustees of the public” included 
a corresponding right of the people to instruct their representatives to the Senate). 
179
 Id. 
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dictated that alter or abolish provisions would become significantly watered down 
during the post-war era.
180
  Congress rejected the constitutions of states that 
attempted to retain the same alter or abolish language from the pre-war era, and 
failed to adequately protect political rights.  The extension of the franchise to 
nonfreeholding males in the first half of the nineteenth century, and the 
significance of political rights in the wake of emancipation made suffrage an 
obvious stand in for the once robust alter or abolish authority.
181
 [quick discussion 
on the legal basis for secession in order to show that the alter or abolish power 
had to be watered down but could not be completely eliminated because of its 
status as a natural right] 
 
During Reconstruction, the Republicans in control of Congress realized that, not 
only did they have to ensure that African-Americans were granted the right to  
vote, they also had to mitigate the natural right to alter and abolish state 
government to prevent ex-confederates from overthrowing the new southern 
regimes.  This process started with ensuring that ex-confederates were 
constitutionally barred from assuming elected office,
182
 and continued by changing 
the nature of rights in state constitutions.
183
  As a result, states that had alter or 
abolish clauses prior to the war, such as Arkansas, Alabama, Texas, and Florida, 
instituted alter and abolish clauses in the 1860s and 1870s that were less far 
reaching than their predecessors of the 1830s, but in response, these states 
increased the political protections and rights of their citizens in the Reconstruction 
era constitutions.  During this era, African-Americans suffrage was the most 
important issue at the time, and it is therefore not surprising that this authority was 
seen as a natural replacement for the more robust alter and abolish provisions.
184
   
 
Notably, only two of the state constitutions adopted by the former confederacy 
during the post-Civil War era added “alter or abolish” provisions to their 
constitutions,
185
 and all of these provisions—both the newly added and the 
                                                 
180
 See footnote 206, infra.  
181
 Many states eliminated freehold requirements well before the Civil War.  See, e.g., 
Miss. Const., Art. I, Sec. 20 (1832) (“No property qualification for eligibility to office, or 
for the right of suffrage, shall ever be required by law in this state.”); Fla. Const. Art. I, 
Sec. 4 (1838) (same).. 
182
 U.S. Const. amend XIV, sec. 3 
183
 See, e.g., Alabama Constitution of 1867, Art. VII, Sec. 3 (providing that “the 
following list of persons shall not be permitted to register, vote or hold office: 1
st
, Those, 
who, during the later rebellion, inflicted, or caused to be inflicted, any cruel or usual 
punishment upon any soldier…of the United States, or who, in any other way, violated the 
rules of civilized warfare.  2d, Those who may be disqualified from holding office by the 
proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States, known as ‘Article XIV’…”). 
184
  
185
 Those states that added alter or abolish provisions constrained this power by 
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preexisting clauses—were qualified in favor of federal power.186  The Civil War 
and Reconstruction era brought about the domestication of the alter or abolish 
power in favor of political rights, recognizing that sovereignty still lies with the 
people but tying this power to principles of republicanism by emphasizing the 
supremacy of federal law.  For example, the South Carolina Constitution did not 
have an alter or abolish provision in its Constitution at the time of the Civil War, 
and rather than add this provision, the 1868 Constitution gave the people the right 
to “at all times…modify their form of government,”187 but noting that “[n]o power, 
civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right 
of suffrage in this State.” 188   Congress had rejected South Carolina’s 1865 
Constitution because the document did not adequately protect the voting rights of 
the emancipated slaves.
189
   
 
                                                                                                                            
referencing federal law and disavowing a right of secession.  See Va. Const. art. I, § 5 
(1872) (adding an alter or abolish provision); id. at art. I, § 2 (“…all attempts, from 
whatever source, or upon whatever pretext, to dissolve said Union or to sever said nation, 
are unauthorized…”); Id. at art. I, § 3 (“That the constitution of the United States, and the 
laws of congress passed in pursuance thereof, constitute the supreme law of the land, to 
which paramount allegiance and obedience are due from every citizen, anything in the 
constitution, ordinances, or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”).  See also 
N.C. Const. art. I, § 3 (1868) (adding an alter or abolish provision); id. at  N.C. Const. art. 
I, § 4 (1868) (“That this State shall ever remain a member of the ' American Union ; that 
the people thereof are part of the American nation ; that there is no right on the part of this 
State to secede, and that all attempts from whatever source or upon whatever pretext, to 
dissolve said Union, or to sever said nation, ought to be resisted with the whole power of 
the State.” 
186
 Notably, Georgia did not have an alter or abolish provision prior to the Civil War, 
and arguably adopted language in its 1861 Constitution that would limit the ability of the 
people to alter or change government.  See Ga. Const. art. I, § 2 (1861) (“God has ordained 
that men shall live under government; but as the forms and administration of civil 
government are in human, and therefore, fallible hands, they may be altered, or modified 
whenever the safety or happiness of the governed requires it. No government should be 
changed for light or transient causes; nor unless upon reasonable assurance that a better 
will be established.”). See, e.g., Louisiana Constitution of 1868 (no alter or abolish 
provision added).   
187
 Compare S.C. Const. art. I, § 1 (1868) (“All political power is vested in and derived 
from the people only, therefore, they have the right at all times to modify their form of 
government.”) with S.C. Const. art. 9, § 1 (1790) (1861) (1865) (“All power is originally 
vested in the people; and all free governments are founded on their authority, and are 
instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness.”). 
188
 S.C. Const. art. II, sec. 2 (1868). 
189
 W. Lewis Burke, Killing, Cheating, Legislating, and Lying: A History of Voting 
Rights in South Carolina After the Civil War, 57 S.C. L. Rev. 859, 861-62 (2006). 
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Like South Carolina, the Alabama Constitution of 1868 gave its citizens the right 
to “change,” but not abolish its government.190  Under the 1819 Constitution, the 
people had retained “a right to alter, reform, or abolish their form of government, 
in such manner as they may think expedient.”191  This document similarly provided 
that “[e]very white male person of the age of twenty one years, or upwards, who 
shall be a citizen of the United States and shall have resided in this State one year 
next proceeding an election, and the last three months within the county, city or 
town in which he offers to vote, shall be deemed a qualified elector,”192 a 
requirement that the 1868 Constitution changed by eliminating the race restriction, 
reducing the residency requirement to six months instead of a year,
193
 and adding a 
requirement that all electors, prior to registering to vote, take an oath that to 
“support and maintain the Constitution and laws of the United States;” “never 
countenance or aid in the secession of this State from the United States;” and 
“accept the civil and political equality of all men.”194     
 
Arkansas’ constitution of 1868 contained a provision that allowed citizens to alter 
or reform government, but it limited the ability of citizens to dissolve their 
connection with or rebel against the federal government,
195
 as compared to its 1836 
Constitution which gave the people an unqualified right to alter or abolish 
government at will.
196
  Arkansas also provided that “all elections shall be free and 
equal” 197 and granted suffrage to “[e]very free white male citizen…who shall have 
attained the age of twenty-one years, and who shall have been a citizen of this 
State six months”198 in its 1836 Constitution, which was expanded by 1868 to, like 
Alabama law, eliminate the race requirement and exclude former confederates 
from voting and holding office.
199
 
 
                                                 
190
 Art. I, Sec. 3 (1868) (“That all political power is inherent in the people, and all free 
governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit; and that, 
therefore, they have, at all times, an inherent right to change their form of government, in 
such manner as they may deem expedient.”).  See also Ala. Const. art. I, § 3 (1875) (same); 
Ala. Const. art. I, § 2 (1901) (same). 
191
 Ala. Const. art. I, § 2 (1819) 
192
 Alabama Constitution Art. III, Sec. 5 (1819). 
193
 Alabama Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 2 (1867).   
194
 Alabama Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 4 (1867).   
195
  
196
  Art. II, Sec. 2 (“That all power is inherent in the people; and all free Governments 
are founded on their authority…For the advancement of these ends, they have, at all times, 
and unqualified right to alter, reform or abolish their Government, in such manner as they 
may think proper.”).  
197
 Arkansas Const. Art. II, Sec. 5. (1836). 
198
 Arkansas Constitution Art. IV, Sec. 2 (1836). 
199
 Arkansas Constitution, Art. VII, Secs. 2-5 (1868). 
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Florida also had an “alter or abolish” provision in its Constitution at the time of 
secession,
200
 but it amended this provision in 1868 to subordinate the people’s alter 
or abolish power to “the paramount allegiance of every citizen” to the federal 
government, and eliminate the ability of the people “to dissolve their connection 
therewith.”201  Like Arkansas, the 1838 Florida Constitution provided for “free and 
equal” elections, extending the vote to every “[e]very free white male person of the 
age of twenty-one and upwards” who was a U.S. citizen, but subject to longer 
residency requirement of “two years next preceding the election at which he shall 
offer to vote.”202  Florida had attempted to retain the alter or abolish language from 
its 1838 Constitution in the first constitution it submitted to Congress in 1865 as a 
condition of readmission, but this constitution was rejected.
203
 Notably, the 1865 
constitution also did not change its suffrage requirements, limiting voting to free 
white males.
204
  Its 1868 constitution was significantly more inclusive, extending 
voting rights to “[e]very male person of the age of twenty-one years…of whatever 
race, color, nationality, or previous condition, who shall…be a citizen,” and it 
reduced the residency requirement from two years to one year.
205
  
 
Once Reconstruction ended, some states reintroduced broader alter or abolish 
provisions, but this right was still qualified by an implicit expectation that the 
people will use political power, rather than violence, to change government.  For 
example, Tennessee kept its alter and abolish provision in both its 1835 and 1870 
Constitutions, but its 1870 Constitution specifically limited the circumstances in 
which this power could be exercised to majoritarian political processes: 
 
The Legislature shall have the right by law to submit to the people…the 
question of calling a convention to alter, reform, or abolish this 
Constitution, or to alter, reform or abolish any specified part or parts of it; 
and when, upon such submission, a majority of all the voters voting upon 
the proposal submitted shall approve the proposal to call a 
convention…No change in, or amendment to, this Constitution proposed 
by such convention shall become effective…unless approved and ratified 
by a majority of the qualified voters…No such convention shall be held 
oftener than once in six years.
206
 
                                                 
200
 Fla. Const. art. I, § 2 (1838) 
201
 Fla. Const. art. 3, § 2 (1868); Fla. Const. art. 1, § 2 (1885). 
202
 Fla. Const. art. I, § 4 (1838); Id. at art. VI, § 1.   
203
 Fla. Const. art. I, § 2 (1865). 
204
 Fla. Const. art. VI, § 1 (1865). 
205
 Fla. Const. art. XIV, § 1 (1868). 
206
 Tenn. Const. art. 10, § 3 (1870).  The 1835 constitution, although it contained a 
similar alter or abolish provision as the 1870 version, did not provide a vehicle for 
abolishing the constitution through official means.  Unlike the 1870 constitution, it required 
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Similarly, in 1874, Arkansas reinstituted a strengthened alter or abolish provision 
than that which existed in the 1868 constitution, giving citizens the right to “alter, 
reform or abolish…[government] in such manner as they think proper”207 yet this 
right was qualified by an expansive requirement of free elections: 
 
Elections shall be free and equal.  No power, civil or military, shall ever 
interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage; nor shall any 
law be enacted, whereby the right to vote at any election shall be made to 
depend upon any previous registration of the elector’s name; or whereby 
such right shall be impaired or forfeited, except for the commission of a 
felony at common law, upon lawful conviction thereof.
208
    
 
Texas followed suit, giving its residents an alter or abolish authority in its 1876 
Constitution after removing this language in its 1869 Constitution,
209
 but subject to 
“the preservation of a republican form of government” rather than inalienable 
“right to alter, reform, or abolish their government” that had existed under the 
1836 Constitution.
210
 In the post-Civil War era, the constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing free and fair elections became significantly more elaborate than its 
alter or abolish provision, signaling a change in the nature of which the people 
express their sovereign authority.
211
  For example, Texas’s 1836 constitution 
granted the right to vote to every citizen, defined as “all free white persons,”212 
“who has attained the age of twenty-one years and shall have resided six month 
within the district or county where the election is held”213 whereas the right of 
suffrage in its 1869 Constitution was more expansive: 
 
Every male citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years and 
upwards, not laboring under the disabilities named in this Constitution, 
                                                                                                                            
that the state legislature initiate the process of constitutional amendment.  See Tenn. Const. 
art. XI, § 3 (1835) (“proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds 
of all the members elected to each House, then it shall be the duty of the General Assembly 
to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the people, in such manner, and at 
such time, as the General Assembly shall prescribe. And if the people shall approve and 
ratify such amendment or amendments, by a majority of all the citizens of the State, voting 
for Representatives, voting in their favor, such amendment or amendments shall become 
part of this Constitution”).       
207
 Arkansas Const. Art. II, Sec. 1 (1874). 
208
 Arkansas Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 2 (1874). 
209
 Tex. Const. art. I (1869). 
210
  
211
 See, e.g., S.C. Const. art. II, sec. 2 (1868);  
212
 Tex. Const. art. 6, § 12 (1836). 
213
 Tex. Const. art. 6, § 11 (1836).   
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without distinction of race, color or former condition, who shall be a 
resident of this State at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, or 
who shall thereafter reside in this State one year, and in the county in 
which he offers to vote sixty days next preceding any election, shall be 
entitled to vote for all officers that are now, or hereafter may be elected by 
the people, and upon all questions submitted to the electors at any 
election…214    
 
This section is markedly different than the suffrage provision of the 1866 Texas 
Constitution rejected by Congress, which limited suffrage to “[e]very free male 
person” rather than “[e]very male citizen,” and it did not disenfranchise former 
confederates,
215
 while retaining the same broad alter or abolish language as its 
1832 counterpart.
216
  In addition to more expansive suffrage that penalized former 
confederates, the 1869 constitution eliminated the alter or abolish provision and the 
preamble to the bill of rights stated, “That the heresies of nullification and 
secession, which brought the country to grief, may be eliminated from future 
political discussion.”217 
 
Even those constitutions adopted in late nineteenth and early twentieth century that 
retained alter and abolish provisions were shadows of the power that had existed at 
the Founding,
218
 using these provisions as a basis for exercising political power 
rather than violent overthrow of government. Mississippi had an “alter or abolish” 
provision that was removed after the Civil War.
219
  It was reinserted in the 1890 
                                                 
214
 Tex. Const. art. 6 § 1 (1869) 
215
 Tex. Const. art. 3 § 1 (1866) 
216
 Tex. Const. art. I, § 1 (1866): 
All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded 
on their authority, and instituted for their benefit' and they have at all times the 
inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their form of government, in such 
manner as they may think expedient. 
217
 Tex. Const. art. I, § 1 (1869) 
218
 The Oklahoma constitution of [date] similarly provided that people have a right to 
“alter or reform” (not to abolish!) their governments, and further, “such change shall not be 
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.” [cite]   The 1865 Missouri constitution 
also kept its alter or abolish provision from its 1820 constitution, although it added that 
“every such right should be exercised in pursuance of law, and consistently with the 
Constitution of the United States.” Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 5. (1865), and it included very 
specific processes by which the constitution could be amended or altered by majoritarian 
processes.  Id. art. XII, § 3.   
219
 The Constitution of 1832, in effect at the time of secession, read:  
That all political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded 
on their authority, and established for their benefit; and, therefore, they have at all 
times an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter or abolish their form of 
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Constitution, and is still a part of the state constitution today; however, like Florida 
and Texas, Mississippi’s citizens could only act in accordance with the alter or 
abolish provision if such action did not violate the U.S. Constitution.
220
  Notably, 
in 1967, Kentucky voters used their constitutional authority to “alter or abolish” as 
a legal basis for changing their constitution through direct democracy.
221
 This use 
of the power as a basis for democratic action, rather than violence, signaled its 
complete evolution from its Revolutionary War origins.
222
   
 
                                                                                                                            
government, in such manner as they may think expedient. 
 
Miss. Const. art. I, § 2 (1832) 
 
After the Civil War, that provision was removed and another provision was added, 
specifically declaring the state would never secede from the union: 
 
The right to withdraw from the Federal Union on account of any real or supposed 
grievances shall never be assumed by this State; nor shall any law be passed in 
derogation of the paramount allegiance of the citizens of this State to the Government 
of the United States. 
 
Miss. Const. art. I, § 20 (1868) 
 
220
 The Constitution in effect today, the Constitution of 1890, maintains an “alter or 
abolish” provision. However, the power to abolish is conditioned on such an action being 
allowed by the U.S. Constitution: 
The people of this state have the inherent, sole, and exclusive right to regulate the 
internal government and police thereof, and to alter and abolish their constitution and 
form of government whenever they deem it necessary to their safety and happiness; 
Provided, Such change be not repugnant to the constitution of the United States. 
Miss. Const. art. III, § 6 (1890). 
In addition, an anti-withdrawal clause remains: 
The right to withdraw from the Federal Union on account of any real or supposed 
grievance, shall never be assumed by this state, nor shall any law be passed in 
derogation of the paramount allegiance of the citizens of this state to the government 
of the United States. 
Miss. Const. art. III, § 7.(1890). 
221
 www.LRC.ky.gov/lrcpubs/1059.pdf 
222
 Kramer, supra note , at 192.  See also Fritz, supra note , at Chapter 8 (discussing the 
debates over the people’s authority to change the constitution outside of existing laws in 
the context of the rebellion in Rhode Island in the 1840s).   The Supreme Court, in Luther 
v. Borden, concedes the existence of this power, although given the outcome of the 
rebellion, it is questionable whether this authority legitimately can be exercised through 
violence.  See Luther v. Borden, (finding that the actions Rhode Island officials under 
martial law were justified).   
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C.  From Power to Right: Voting as a Ninth Amendment Right that Bind the 
States 
 
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, forty-nine state constitutions contain an affirmative 
right to vote.
223
  It is no surprise, therefore, that state courts have historically been 
more amenable to voting claims premised on democratic notions of participation 
than federal courts.
224
  Additionally, as the prior section shows, the rise of suffrage 
as a substantive right under state constitutions corresponded with the decline of the 
right to abolish state governments in those same documents, arguably illustrating 
how suffrage was one of the rights (along with speech and assembly) that replaced 
the alter or abolish right as the primary expression of popular sovereignty.  
 
Despite the sovereign pedigree of voting as an heir to the revolutionary era alter or 
abolish provisions, voting had never found its place as an explicit right under the 
U.S. Constitution until the Supreme Court read it into the Equal Protection Clause 
in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections.  While the framers of the 
Constitution viewed state law as the ultimate source of who can vote in federal 
elections, the Court did not utilize state law as a basis for conceptualizing the right.  
Instead, the Court recognized the mandatory nature of the right to vote in federal 
elections, while leaving the right to vote in state elections as entirely permissive.  
To the extent that the right to vote in state elections has its foundations in the right 
of the people to alter or abolish their governments, however, it would have been 
more consistent for the Court to read the Ninth Amendment as encompassing a 
right to vote in state elections that is also mandatory in nature.  Notably, Akhil 
Amar has referred to the “collective right of We the People to alter or abolish 
government” as “the most obvious and inalienable right” underlying the Ninth 
                                                 
223
 See Josh Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions.  See, e.g., Ariz. 
Const. art. II, § 21 (“All elections shall be free and equal, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.”); Ga. Const. 
art. II, § 1, P 2 (“Every person who is a citizen of the United States and a resident of 
Georgia as defined by law, who is at least 18 years of age and not disenfranchised by this 
article, and who meets minimum residency requirements as provided by law shall be 
entitled to vote at any election by the people.”); Ind. Const. art. II, § 1 (“All elections shall 
be free and equal.”); Iowa Const. art. II, § 1 (“Every citizen of the United States [meeting 
the age and residency requirements] … shall be entitled to vote at all elections which are 
now or hereafter may be authorized by law.”); N.M. Const. art. II, § 8 (“All elections shall 
be free and open, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the right of suffrage.”) 
224
 Rick Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 69; See also Weinschenk v. 
State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006) (striking down a photo identification law as a violation 
of the right to vote under the state constitution). 
DRAFT --NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR DISTRIBUTION 2/17/2014 7:11 PM 
43 POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY FOUNDATIONS [Vol. __:_ 
 
 
 
 
Amendment;”225 other scholars also adhere to this view of the Ninth as containing 
this principle.
226
   
 
Inherent in the argument that the Ninth Amendment protects the right to alter or 
abolish government is that the Amendment only protects collective rights, rather 
than individual rights like the right to vote.
227
  Arguably, the Ninth Amendment 
does not have to be read this narrowly—its historical antecedents suggest that it 
was adopted because of Anti-Federalists concerns that enumerating some rights 
would imply the exclusion of others, suggesting that positive rights and natural 
rights, rather than just collective rights, could also be protected under the Ninth 
Amendment.
228
  Given that concerns about rights were at the heart of its adoption, 
it is plausible that the Ninth Amendment was designed to protect both the 
individual rights and the collective rights of the people, a view further bolstered by 
the historical link between the power to alter or abolish government and the 
exercise of political rights like voting, speech, petition, and assembly in 
furtherance of this right.
229
  While voting may fall short of being accorded the 
status of a natural right,
230
 a view of the Ninth Amendment that would exclude 
                                                 
225
 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 120 (1998). 
226
 Jeffery Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 Yale L.J. 
1078 (1991); Randy Barnett,   
227
  
228
 See Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 250 (2001) (“What rights did 
the Ninth Amendment protect? They had to be either ‘natural rights’ or ‘positive rights’, to 
use the terms Madison employed in the notes for the great speech of June 8 advocating 
amendments.  In that speech he distinguished ‘the preexistent rights of nature’ from those 
‘resulting from the social compact’…[and] he mentioned freedom of ‘speech’ as a natural 
right…”).  See Rosen, supra note , at (arguing that, in addition to the power to alter or 
abolish government, the Ninth Amendment protects the individual rights to “worship God 
according to the dictates of conscience” and of “defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing and protecting property…”).  See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost 
Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty 258 (2004) (discussing other rights referred to as 
“natural in the documentary sources” including “the right to emigrate or to form a new 
state, the rights of assembly, and the freedom of speech”).  See Lash, supra note , at 88 
(describing Ninth Amendment rights as “individual, majoritarian, or collective”). 
229
 See Randy Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 
1, 16 (pushing back against the argument that the Ninth Amendment only protects 
collective rights).  But see Lash, supra note 89 (arguing that a retained right might be 
“individual in nature but collective in terms of the combined effect of the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments”). 
230
 See Keyssar, supra note , at 12 (discussing how the notion of voting as a natural 
right had gained a foothole in post-revolutionary America because “it meshed well with the 
Lockean political theory popular in eighteenth century America, it had a clear 
antimonarchial thrust, and it had the virtue of simplicity” but such arguments never became 
dominant because “there was no way to argue that voting was a…natural right without 
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voting, which at a minimum is a positive or majoritarian right,
231
 is untenable, as 
this would suggest that the Amendment protects a right to alter or abolish 
government with no corresponding authority to define the means by which this 
right will be enforced.
232
  Moreover, state constitutions extended suffrage to their 
residents prior to the ratification of the Constitution, suggesting that even if voting 
is not a natural right, it can still be a “retained” right under the Constitution.233 
 
Indeed, the sovereignty authority that the people retained under the Tenth 
Amendment, given the limitations placed on the right of revolution by the 
Guarantee Clause, arguably require the Ninth to protect a category of rights that 
are central to exercising this power.
234
  Thus, contrary to the view advocated by 
some scholars, the Ninth Amendment cannot be a mere truism,
 235
 defined by 
                                                                                                                            
opening Pandora’s box”). 
231
 Lash, supra note 88. 
232
 While Lash denies that the Ninth Amendment is a source of right, at the very least, 
it protects the people’s authority to define and regulate rights protected by state law.  See 
id.  To illustrate this principle, Lash discusses the Alien and Sedition Acts which James 
Madison argued violated the First and Tenth Amendments because “the First Amendment 
denied the federal government control over the retained right to freedom of speech, [and] 
the Tenth Amendment left seditious libel under the control of the people of the several 
states”).  The Ninth and Tenth Amendments protect the people’s authority to define and 
regulate retained rights, regardless if those rights are viewed as individual or collective and 
regardless if the Ninth Amendment is actually the source of the right.  Id. at 88.   
233
 Cf. Barnett, supra note , at   60-61 (describing retained rights as “rights that people 
possess before they form a government and therefore retain; they are not positive rights 
created by the government.”) with Lash, supra note , at 88 (defining a retaining right as “a 
right withheld from governmental control” and arguing that the Ninth Amendment leaves 
to the people the decision of how and when a right can be regulated). 
234
  
235
 See, e.g., Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment as Perceived by Randy Barnett, 88 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1508 (1994); Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual 
Liberty: The Ninth Amendment's Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. & Pol. 63 (1987); Thomas B. 
McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights “Retained” by the 
People, 16 S. Ill. U. L.J. 267, 268 (1992); Caplan.  See also Gary Lawson, A Truism with 
an Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional Context, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 469, 
472 (2008) (“The Bill of Rights, including the Tenth Amendment, in large measure simply 
reformulates the restrictions on federal power built into the Sweeping [Necessary and 
Proper] Clause.”); Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth 
Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1889 (2008) (noting that the Tenth Amendment “delivered on a promise to the state 
conventions that the federal government would have only expressly delegated power”).  
See, e.g.,  Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 
1345 (S.D.AL.2002) (arguing that the Tenth Amendment “expresses only the ‘tautology,’ 
inherent in a Constitution of limited and enumerated federal powers, that whatever is not 
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reference to those provisions of the U.S. Constitution that expressly delegate 
power to the federal government.
236
 As Kurt Lash has argued, these Amendments 
also declare that “those powers which are delegated are not to be construed as 
having no other limits besides those enumerated in the Constitution;” such a 
reading, according to Lash, “would have the effect of denying or disparaging the 
people’s retained rights—rights which, by definition, were retained by the people 
in the states.”237  To go one step further, defining Ninth Amendment rights and 
Tenth Amendment powers by reference to what the federal government retains 
also assumes that the interests of the state and those of the people are identical, 
while ignoring the sovereignty that people retain in their own right.
238
  The Ninth 
Amendment is the textual home for power-rights that express the sovereign 
                                                                                                                            
conferred on the federal government or prohibited to the states is by process of elimination 
reserved to the states.”); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (same).   
236
 Cf. Massey, supra note at 1239 (“the inescapable conclusion remains that both 
amendments were intended to preserve to the people of the states the sovereign’s 
prerogative to confer powers upon their state governmental agents (recognized in the tenth 
amendment) and to create personal liberties inviolate from governmental invasion 
(recognized in the tenth amendment).  The intended medium for doing so, in both cases, 
was the state constitution.”).  Massey is not alone in viewing the Ninth Amendment as a 
source of judicially enforceable unenumerated rights.  See Randy E. Barnett, James 
Madison's Ninth Amendment, in 1 Rights Retained by the People; Thomas C. Grey, The 
Original Understanding and the Unwritten Constitution, in Toward a More Perfect Union: 
Six Essays on the Constitution 145 (1988); John Kaminski, Restoring the Declaration of 
Independence: Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, in The Bill of Rights 150 (1987); 
Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. 
But What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 239  
(1988); Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution.  Nor is Massey alone in viewing 
state law as a potential source of Ninth Amendment rights.  See Lash, supra note , at 399 
(“All retained rights, natural or otherwise, were protected from denial or disparagement as 
a result of the decision to enumerate “certain rights.” Neither the text nor the purpose of the 
Ninth Amendment was limited to protecting a subcategory of retained rights. The point was 
to protect the right of the people to manage all those affairs not intended to be handed over 
to the federal government.”).  
237
 Lash, supra note , at 93.   
238
 Randy Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 5 
(“when rights are viewed as the logical obverse of powers, content can be given to 
unenumerated rights by exclusively focusing on the expressed provisions delegating 
powers…avoiding the need to directly address the substance of unenumerated rights” and 
second, this approach “seems to avoid any internal conflict or logical contradiction 
between constitutional rights and powers.”).  Lash, supra note , at 90 (“Together, these two 
amendments preserve all nondelegated powers and rights to the decisionmaking authority 
of the people in the states, who may then leave the matter to the majoritarian political 
process or exempt the subject from the political process by placing it in the state 
constitution”). 
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authority retained by the people under the Tenth Amendment.
 239
  Most important, 
the right to vote, as the key power-right, derives almost entirely from state 
constitutional law, illustrating that state law stands as the source of developing the 
contours of the right, which is in line with what some scholars advocate as the 
purpose behind the Ninth Amendment.
240
     
 
Calvin Massey, for example, has argued that the Ninth Amendment “allow[s] the 
people of each state to define unenumerated rights under their own constitution and 
laws, free from federal interference.”241  As Massey observes, this is consistent 
with a dynamic conception of the Ninth Amendment that “reserve[s] to people 
their rights under local law,” and therefore, it makes sense “for a state polity to 
have within its own control the continued vitality of any given state constitutional 
right.”242  In making the argument that the source of Ninth Amendment rights are 
to found in state constitutional law, however, Massey argues that states have the 
authority to rescind or otherwise alter there rights even though they have attained 
the status of a federal constitutional guarantee.
243
  The difficulty with this argument 
is that, during the Founding era, the alter or abolish power was viewed as 
inviolable and implicit in the sovereignty retained by the people, suggesting that 
they are limitations to the state’s ability to rescind Ninth Amendment rights.  
Using state constitutional law as a source of Ninth Amendment rights means, in 
practice, that the scope of the right to vote that the people enjoy under state law 
will vary by state, as did the right of people to alter or abolish their governments, 
                                                 
239
 Although Kurt Lash takes a narrow view of the Tenth Amendment, he argues that 
the Ninth Amendment serves a rule of construction for interpreting the limitations of the 
Tenth Amendment.  Kurt T. Lash, The Lost History of the Ninth Amendment (2009).  
While I am not convinced that the Tenth Amendment merely restates that the federal 
government is one of limited powers, my argument draws on Kurt Lash’s observation that 
the Ninth Amendment, like the Tenth, is also about the power that the people have to 
regulate and define retained rights at the state level.  See text accompanying footnotes , 
infra.   
240
 See Lash, supra note , at 251 (“the ratifiers were promised that all nondelegated 
powers and rights were retained by the people in the states——‘retained’ being the 
operative word for it signaled a preexistent collection of sovereign peoples and guaranteed 
that these people would retain their independent sovereign existence after ratification.”). 
241
 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1229, 1238. 
242
 Id.  The idea of Ninth Amendment rights as “dynamic” rights that can change over 
time is consistent with what Larry Kramer has described as constitutional modification 
through popular consent, in which “the constitution could be altered by clear, convulsive 
expressions of popular will.”  Larry D. Kramer, By the People Themselves: Popular 
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 15 (2004).   
243
 Massey, supra note at 1248.  Kurt Lash has also suggested that state law can be a 
source of unenumerated Ninth Amendment rights, although he does not go into detail about 
whether states can rescind these rights.   
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but this is consistent with the state level experimentalism embraced by our system 
of federalism
244
 and the notion that rights that owe their existence to state law are 
dynamic, rather than static.
245
 Nonetheless, states do not have the authority to 
rescind the right to vote or any other participatory rights that were part and parcel 
of the inviolable right to alter or abolish government, consistent with founding era 
assumptions that this right was inherent in the sovereignty retained by the 
people.
246
 
      
The fact that state constitutional law is the source of, first, the alter or abolish 
provisions, and later the right to vote, also means that the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments incorporate the basic assumption that these rights apply against both 
the states, and through Article V, the federal government.
247 
 Logically, it makes 
little sense to exclude the Ninth Amendment from binding the states given that the 
Ninth Amendment preserves the people’s independent sovereign authority that 
predated the Union.
248
  In addition, states have, to some extent, bound themselves 
by giving the people significant authority over their composition and the execution 
of their laws, authority that has existed at the state level for well over two hundred 
years.
249
  In this vein, Ninth Amendment rights “amount[] to a federally enforced 
right to make the states abide by their own law,”250 which is something that the 
Supreme Court had already started to do with respect to the right to vote under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but, because of the 
                                                 
244
 Gregory v. Ashcroft 
245
 Massey, supra note , at 1248; Kurt Lash, The Lost History of the Ninth Amendment 
88 (“Retained rights may be individual, majoritarian, or collective, and the Ninth 
Amendment ensures that all such rights are left under the control of the people in the 
states.”).  
246
 See Fritz, supra note , at 274-75 (noting that the right to alter or abolish government 
is “inherent” and a part of the people’s sovereignty, a position vindicated by the Supreme 
Court in Luther v. Borden).  
247
 Some commentators argue that the Ninth Amendment rights apply only against the 
federal government because that amendment has not been incorporated against the states 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.  See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 
243 (1833).  See also Ely, at 37; Berger, at 23-24.   
248
 Cf. Lash, supra note , at 76 (arguing that the Ninth Amendment “does not limit the 
power of state governments” but state officials must follow it as a rule of construction). 
249
 Massey, supra note at 1251 (arguing that Ninth Amendment rights are still federal 
rights, despite the fact that their contours are defined by reference to state law, and they 
should not be distinguished from other federal rights that are incorporated against the 
states). 
250
 Id. (citing Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights, 38 Hastings L.J. 305, 327 
(1987)). 
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limitations of that clause, the Court has fallen short of articulating an accurate and 
compelling view of the right over the long term.
251
   
 
This view of the right to vote as one part federal constitutional guarantee and one 
part creature of state law has been lurking in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
for over a hundred years.  While the Nineteenth Amendment has repudiated Minor 
v. Happerset, the Court rightfully conceived of the right to vote in both state and 
federal elections as entirely derivative of state law, a fact that is consistent with 
how the current Court views state control over the franchise in the context of state 
elections.
252
  In Minor, the Court observed that the “United States has no voters in 
the States of its own creation,”253 a conception of voting that remains true today.  
Other cases decided around the same time as Minor also defers to states’ authority 
to define the right of suffrage and who has access to it,
 254
 and while states are 
constrained in their ability to discriminate in voting, they still retain substantial 
control over access to the ballot.
255
  Shelby County v. Holder and Arizona v. Inter 
Tribal Council have corroborated this view of state authority, noting that 
“[p]rescribing voting qualifications…‘forms no part of the power to be conferred 
upon the national government’ by the Elections Clause, which is ‘expressly 
restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of 
elections.’”256 
 
                                                 
251
 Id. (discussing Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’r of Webster 
County, 109 S.Ct. 633 (1989) (finding an equal protection violation where the West 
Virginia tax assessor’s practice of assessing property price differently for land recently sold 
and older properties caused huge disparities in valuation in violation of the West Virginia 
constitution).  (discuss other examples above the line).  Also, note that there is a line of 
cases which hold that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from forcing state 
officials to enforce state law, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman 465 
U.S. 89 (1984), a case that Massey distinguishes by noting that Allegheny “posed an issue 
of federal law, albeit one the substance of which was supplied by a state constitution, while 
Pennhurst raised a claim of pure state law, with no federal medium to transmute the 
asserted state right into a federal guarantee.”).  
252
 Arizona v. Inter Tribal; Shelby County 
253
  
254
 See, e.g., Giles v. Harris.  Cruikshank? 
255
 Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invalidating the formula of 
section 4(b) of the VRA, which determined the jurisdictions that had to preclear with the 
federal government any changes to their election laws before the changes could go into 
effect).  Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013) (holding 
that the National Voter Registration Act preempts Arizona’s requirement that citizens show 
proof of citizenship in order to register to vote).     
256
 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2258 (2013). 
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As should be readily apparent, this view of the Ninth Amendment right to vote 
calls into question the lockstepping that state courts have engaged in as a part of 
interpreting the right to vote under state constitutions.
257
  As Josh Douglas has 
recently argued, the deference that state courts give to the federal constitution, in 
many cases attempting to create parity between state and federal conceptions of the 
right to vote, actually has the effect of undermining the right.
258
  Since all state 
constitutions explicitly provide voting protection to their citizens, including in 
most cases recognizing an explicit right to vote, Douglas rightly argues that parity 
between state and federal constitutions is not only unwarranted, but undesirable, 
given that the federal constitution’s recognition of the right to vote is implicit, 
judicially created, and most important, more narrow than the right to vote 
recognized by state constitutions.
259
  This approach by state courts ignores that 
virtually every state constitution goes further than the federal constitution in 
protecting voting rights, an oversight that is inconsistent with the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendment protections that the people have vis a vis the states.  
 
Instead, the lockstepping should work the other way.  Conceptions of the right to 
vote in certain federal elections should almost solely be informed by the popular 
sovereignty principle and state conceptions of the right to vote.  Because Article I, 
§ 2 links the qualification of electors for state and federal elections, this principle 
provides the framework for the right to vote in federal elections.  The normative 
implications of this, discussed in the next section, are several.
260
 With the 
exception of presidential elections, state law would supply the rule of decision with 
respect the right to vote in federal elections, a reading that does not disturb much 
of the authority that states already have with respect to crafting the rules that 
govern both state and federal elections.
261
  Thus, this deference to state 
                                                 
257
  
258
    
259
 See also 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 313, 318 (2007) (noting that “[state] courts recently 
confronted with voter participation claims have generally begun by asking whether there 
exists a Supreme Court precedent that applies strict scrutiny or lenient review to a facially 
similar law. If so, and if the court is satisfied that the law at issue is sufficiently similar, the 
court will take shelter under the Supreme Court's decision.”). 
260
 My argument also suggests that perhaps federal courts should be looking to state 
courts in defining the contours of the federal right to vote, a point that Josh Douglas has 
persuasively argued.  See  
261
 This is important because there is a credible argument that this view of the Ninth 
Amendment as creating a federal enforced guarantee based in state constitutional law could 
create a conflict between state and federal law that runs afoul of the Supremacy Clause.  
See Massey, supra note , at 1253 (arguing that in cases of conflict, “the right that has its 
source in federal law should prevail”).  Such conflicts are unlikely here because the Article 
expressly observes that the federal electoral regime is different given the nature of the U.S. 
government as representative rather than a pure democracy, and therefore the popular 
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constitutional authority is consistent with those provisions of the Constitution that 
directly bear on elections – for example, Article I, section 4’s proscription that 
“[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;” 
Article I, Section 2’s delegation of authority to choose the qualification of electors 
so long as “the Electors in each States shall have the Qualifications requisite for 
Electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.”262  In this context, 
Congress can veto contrary state laws pursuant to its authority under the Elections 
Clause and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; nonetheless, states still 
retain plenary authority to determine the substantive contours of the right to 
vote.
263
  The popular sovereignty principle dictates that state elections function 
differently.  While states also retain the authority to craft rules that govern its own 
elections under the Tenth Amendment,  courts must approach the regulation of 
state elections differently than it does with respect to federal elections, giving 
equal weight to the popular sovereignty principles embraced by the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments.    
 
III. THE POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY PRINCIPLE IN ACTION: ASSESSING THE 
VALIDITY OF STATE ELECTORAL REGULATIONS 
 
As the prior section shows, the popular sovereignty foundations of the right to vote 
undermine the argument that the right to vote is an equal protection concept that 
states can rescind at will, even for their own elections.
264
  This analysis does not, 
however, validate the strict scrutiny used to assess the poll tax in Harper v. State 
Board of Elections, a standard that can obscure the considerable authority that 
states do have in this context.
265
  This reframing of the right suggests that a 
reformulated Anderson v. Celebrezze/Burdick v. Takushi/Crawford v. Marion 
County sliding scale analysis may be a better fit to assess burdens on the right to 
vote rather than strict scrutiny advocated by some scholars because balancing 
                                                                                                                            
sovereignty principle would be much more narrow in the context of federal elections.  See 
Part , supra.  Indeed, the focus here is on the regulation of state legislative redistricting, 
which has little, if any implication, for the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
262
  
263
 See Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty? 
264
 Start this section with a discussion of this news story? 
http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/arizona/capitol_media_services/article_8a05991e-7f04-
11e3-8a04-001a4bcf887a.html 
265
 See Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement.  
See also Fishkin, supra note , at 1329 (defending the balancing approach in Crawford 
because it “nudged courts' role away from the broad structural evaluation and redesign of 
election administration regimes and toward a clear focus on whether individual voters are 
being excluded”). 
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allows courts to weigh the voter’s interest and the state’s interest from the baseline 
that both are constitutionally and historically grounded.  This analysis is contrary 
to most approaches in the legal scholarship, which has extensively criticized the 
Burdick balancing test for privileging the state’s interest over the importance of the 
right to vote, particularly in light of the structural obstacles insulating the major 
political parties from competition and therefore limiting the ability of voters to 
participate in the political process.
266
  In this context, the popular sovereignty 
principle would level the playing field, forcing the court to consider the arguments 
on both sides rather than proceeding from the baseline that states enjoy plenary 
authority to regulate access to the franchise while voters have little or no 
corresponding interest at stake.
267
  To illustrate this concept, Parts III (A) and (B) 
explores the popular sovereignty principle in the context of ballot access and voter 
identification regulations.
268
 
 
This right to vote, as an expression of sovereign authority that derived from state 
level alter or abolish provisions, and by implication, followed the people into the 
creation of the union, can be read into the Ninth and Tenth Amendments using the 
same the interpretive method that the Court has applied with respect to determining 
the power that the states retain in its Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.  In U.S 
Term Limits v. Thornton, the Supreme Court held that states retain the powers held 
pre-ratification and that were not expressly delegated to the federal government.  
                                                 
266
 Pildes and Issacharoff (describing this as a political lockup that justified heightened 
judicial scrutiny).   
267
 See generally James Fishkin, Deliberation by the People Themselves: Entry Points 
for the Public Voice, 12 Election L.J. 490, 490, (2014) (arguing that the “evaluation and/or 
selection of candidates in the nomination phase” is a way in which the people themselves 
practice deliberative democracy). 
268
 To the extent that the Court has determined that Article I, § 2 is an exclusive 
delegation to the states of the authority to set voter qualifications for state and federal 
elections, then the popular sovereignty principle is also a constraint on state authority in 
this area.  See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona.  However, the effect on federal 
power is much more limited because there are no “voters” created by federal law, per se, 
and there are federalism considerations that may impact the constitutionality of state action 
as it relates to federal elections. See Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty. This part of 
the argument focuses exclusively on election administration and ballot access, not other 
regulations that implicate the right to vote but might arguably be considered “manner” 
regulations under the Elections Clause, like redistricting and reapportionment, that 
Congress can preempt at will.  See, e.g., Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a 
Safeguard of Federalism.  Even though election administration and ballot access 
regulations implicate different constitutional values, see Daniel P. Tokaji, Response: 
Judicial Review of Election Administration, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 379 (2008), 
both impact the voter’s ability to participate in elections, subject to minimal federal 
oversight, and therefore demand some consideration of the popular sovereignty principle.      
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Thornton involved an Arkansas state constitutional amendment that sought to 
impose term limits on individuals elected to the U.S. House of Representatives and 
Senate.
269
  The U.S. Constitution contains age, citizenship and residency 
requirements for those offices, but says nothing about term limits.
270
  Thornton 
relies on the text of the Qualifications Clauses in drawing a distinction between the 
powers given the new central government and those retained by the sovereign 
states over congressional qualifications, inferring that these provisions are 
exclusive and cannot be supplemented by the states.
271
  By looking at the text of 
the Tenth Amendment as well as the convention and ratification debates, the Court 
determined that the power to add qualifications of the House or the Senate was not 
within the power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment because the 
states did not possess this authority prior to the ratification of the Constitution.
272
               
 
The text of the Tenth Amendment similarly draws a distinction between the 
powers retained by the people and those of the states, suggesting that these two 
categories are not necessarily coterminous; the Ninth Amendment likewise 
protects the authority of the people to define the scope of this power through 
majoritarian processes.
273
  The historical analysis illustrates that voters enjoyed 
greater rights of participation at the state level; applying a Thorton-esque retained 
rights analysis means that these rights followed them into the union.  This 
preexisting level of participation is the framework from which we adjudge the 
constitutionality of current regulations. Judges are equipped to perform this 
assessment, as it is very similar to the analysis in cases under Section 5 of the 
                                                 
269
 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
270
 See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (qualifications for the House); Art. I, § 3, cl. 3 
(qualifications for the senate). 
271
Thornton, 514 U.S. at 801. 
272
 The Ninth and Tenth Amendments also may protect less traditional rights of 
participation, at least to the extent that these rights are parallel to those that existed at the 
Founding.  For example, one such right might be the idea that people could have a 
constitutionally cognizable interest in participating in ballot initiatives and referendum at 
the state level, traceable to the power delegated to the people by early state constitutions.  
See, e.g., The Constitution of Pennsylvania 1776, Art. III, available at 
http://www.wordservice.org/State%20Constitutions/usa1021.htm (“That the people of this 
State have the sole, exclusive and inherent right of governing and regulating the internal 
police of the same.”).  Id. at Art. IV (“That all power being originally inherent in, and 
consequently derived from, the people; therefore all officers of government, whether 
legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to 
them.”).  See also The Constitution of North Carolina 1776, Art. II, available at   
http://www.wordservice.org/State%20Constitutions/usa1022.htm (“That the people of this 
State ought to have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and 
police thereof.”). 
273
 Lash 
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Voting Rights Act, where courts determine whether minorities are worse off by 
comparing the proposed change to the current law in order determine if the new 
rule is “retrogressive.”274  The analysis here is a bit broader—it looks at the level 
of participation that the people in the state had historically—in determining 
whether the new rule makes them worse off. Similar to section 5, however, such 
burdens can be justified if the state is trying to address a problem in its electoral 
system, or comply with federal law.
275
  These rights of participation are articulated 
through the right to vote, a value that can be captured in modern doctrine by 1) 
viewing the proposed law in the broader historical context of the state’s electoral 
apparatus to determine whether the people have a reliance interest in the status 
quo, and 2) comparing the state’s prior law to the proposed change and assessing 
whether voters are worse off under the new regime.  I take each of them in turn. 
 
A. The Foundations of the Reliance Interest: Restrictive Ballot Access 
Laws as Infringements of the Popular Sovereignty Principle 
 
Ballot access laws, which are inextricably tied to the right to vote, are instructive 
of the reliance interest since the Court utilizes the same framework to assess both 
ballot access laws and restrictions on the right to vote.  Moreover, the question of  
whether ballot access regulations are “restrictive” often turns on an assessment of 
the state’s electoral structure as a whole, an analysis that is key to determining the 
reliance interests people have developed relative to participating in their respective 
state electoral systems.
276
  
 
In Bullock v. Carter, the Court invalidated the filing fees imposed by Texas to run 
as a candidate for certain offices.  Some of these fees ranged as high as $8,900, and 
had an appreciable effect on exercise of the ballot, even though there were other 
avenues available to candidates to get on the ballot that did not require the payment 
                                                 
274
 See, e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140-41 (1976) (“the purpose of 
section 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that 
would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their 
effective exercise of the electoral franchise”); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479 
(2003) (“any assessment of the retrogression of a minority group’s effective exercise of the 
franchise depends on an examination of all of the relevant circumstances, such as the 
ability of minority voters to elect their candidate of choice, the extent of the minority 
group’s opportunity to participate in the political process, and the feasibility of creating a 
nonretrogressive plan.”).  
275
 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (assuming without deciding that racial 
gerrymanders that otherwise violate the Constitution could be justified in order to comply 
with sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act). 
276
 See Anderson v. Celebrezze; Crawford v. Marion County 
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of a filing fee.
277
  Notably, the Court did not view ballot access laws as imposing 
the same burden on the right to vote as it did on the candidate’s ability to get on the 
ballot.
278
  Nevertheless, the Court recognized that “the rights of voters and the 
rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation” so the Court chose 
to assess the impact of the ballot access laws on the exercise of the franchise, 
consistent with the rigorous analysis commanded by Harper v. Virginia Board of 
Elections.
279
    
 
Burdick v. Takushi represented a departure from this approach, both doctrinally 
and theoretically.  The petitioner wanted to write in Donald Duck as his candidate 
of choice for a congressional election, but was barred from doing so by state 
law.
280
  Rejecting the argument that the petitioner had a First Amendment right to 
write in his preferred candidate, the Court found that state law provided myriad 
opportunity for the petitioner to get his preferred candidate on the ballot.  The idea 
that the petitioner’s voting related harm can be vindicated by running his own 
candidate is a reflection of Founding era views that there should be space between 
the voter and the government; the ability of the voter to use the ballot as a place for 
dissent runs counter to this impulse.  Burdick reaffirmed the connection between 
ballot access and voting, but did so in order to reinforce a fairly restrictive view of 
the right to vote.
281
   
 
The contrast between the framers’ view of governance by elites and the democracy 
that persisted at the state level highlights a significant flaw in Burdick: the Court 
has interpreted the states’ authority over both ballot access and voting from the 
                                                 
277
 Id. (rejecting the State’s argument that “a candidate can gain a place on the ballot in 
the general election without payment of fees by submitting a proper application 
accompanied by a voter petition” on the grounds that it forces the candidate to bypass the 
primary election which “may be more crucial than the general election in certain parts of 
Texas”).  See also Lubin v. Panish 
278
 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (applying the Harper standard for review of ballot access 
laws). 
279
 Id. 
280
 See also Harper (avoiding the question of whether there is a first amendment right 
to vote in state elections, but grounding the right to vote in federal elections in conceptions 
of equal protection).  But see Part IV (arguing that the popular sovereignty principle 
influences federal elections because of the link in Article I, Section 2 for voter 
qualifications in both state and federal elections). 
281
 See Richard Pildes and Samuel Issacharoff. Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups 
of the Democratic Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643, 669 (1998) (“For the most part, ballot 
access restrictions represent a problem of legislative, rather than intertemporal, 
entrenchment.  There is little reason to suppose that most voters wish to foreclose the 
option of expressing discontent with the traditional political parties by supporting an 
occasional third party or independent challenger.”). 
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perspective of the representative government that exists at the federal level, with 
its initial reservations about access to the ballot, rather than from the baseline of 
the democratizing impulse and broad access to the franchise that has historically 
permeated the electoral systems of most states since the 1850s (but as early as the 
1770s).
282
  Because the constitutional text links the voter qualifications of state and 
federal elections, placing the onus on the states to decide who can vote, this is a 
significant oversight. 
 
Consideration of the popular sovereignty principle also validates criticism offered 
by Professors Pildes and Issacharoff, that the Court did not properly consider the 
write in ban n the broader scheme of Hawaii’s electoral apparatus, but this same 
consideration does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that these scholars 
advocate: that the write-in ban impermissibly burdened the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of the voter.
 283
  Pildes and Issacharoff’s argument that 
anticompetitive state action in the electoral arena is constitutionally problematic 
implies that the state has an affirmative obligation to ensure that its electoral 
apparatus is competitive.
284
 This claim can be constitutionally grounded in the 
popular sovereignty principle, at least to the extent that a competitive electoral 
structure is historically justifiable, or alternatively, was an aspect of the electoral 
structure in the state prior to the adoption of the contested rule,
285
 yet this does not 
                                                 
282
 I recognize that women and minorities could not vote in the 1850s, and democracy 
at the time was viewed as extending the vote to nonfreeholding white males and, in some 
cases, noncitizens, Keyssar, but “democracy” should be read in light of our evolving 
constitutional tradition in favor of universal access to the ballot.  See U.S. Const. amends. 
XIV; XV; IXX; XXIV; XXVI.  See also Reva Siegel, She the People: the Nineteenth 
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002) 
(arguing that the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments have to be read together despite 
section 2 of the Fourteenth’s language prohibition of abridgments on the right of males to 
vote).       
283
 See id. at 672-73 (criticizing the Court for applying “conventional individual-rights 
analysis”  “Burdick represents a contemporary variant of Nixon v. Herndon. In each case, a 
singularly powerful political party used its control over the state electoral machinery to 
devise rules of engagement that prevented internal defection.”)  But see Christopher 
Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and 
Opportunities, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 313, 353 (arguing that this criticism “goes too far” 
because it “was the petitioner who framed the case in ‘narrow, individualistic, nonsystemic 
terms”).   
284
  
285
 In other words, it depends on whether a state explicitly has embraced a democratic 
structure.  See generally Fishkin, supra note , at 493 (“[D]emocracy is not about collective 
will formation but just a ‘competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ to use Schumpeter’s 
famous phrase.  Legal guarantees, particularly constitutional ones, are designed to protect 
against tyranny of the majority.  Within that constraint, all we need are competitive 
elections.”) (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 
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necessarily seem to be true of Hawaii.  There is no history of write in voting in the 
time before or since Hawaii became a state.  The write-in ban litigated in Burdick 
had been in place in Hawaii since the 1890s, suggesting that the state has, 
historically, been less democratic than others.
286
  After Congress annexed the 
islands in in 1898, Congress created a territorial government that had an elected 
legislature but an appointed governor.  In addition, Congress retained the right to 
veto territorial legislation, a right that it never used, but nonetheless, undermined 
the notion that Hawaii was overly “democratic” prior to its admission as the fiftieth 
state in 1959.
287
  More recently, while certain counties have a limited initiative 
process, giving voters more direct control over policy, but there is no statewide 
process for ballot initiatives and referendum.
288
 Thus, on balance, voters have no 
reliance interest that would justify the claim that they are entitled to write-in a 
candidate for state elections, as Hawaii has never been a bastion of democratic 
participation either historically or with respect to this particular issue.   
 
In contrast, the ban on fusion candidacies in Minnesota, which has history of being 
solicitous to third parties, is significantly more problematic.
289
 In Timmons v. Twin 
Cities Area New Party, the Court held that prohibiting fusion candidacies, where 
individuals appear on the ballot as the candidate of more than one party, did not 
violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the third parties because the 
ballot is not “fora for political expression.”290 Like Burdick, the Court ignored the 
                                                                                                                            
(1942)). 
286
  
287
 JOHN S. WHITEHEAD, COMPLETING THE UNION: ALASKA, HAWAI’I, AND THE 
BATTLE FOR STATEHOOD 16 (2004). 
288
 http://ballotpedia.org/History_of_Initiative_%26_Referendum_in_Hawaii 
289
 See also Pildes and Issacharoff, supra note , at 683 (“The fusion strategy for third 
parties had its heyday at the end of the nineteenth century, particularly in the Midwest 
where Populists, Greenbackers, and other lesser groups used coalitions with the Democrats, 
the weaker of the major parties, to provide a viable electoral forum for their views. 152 To 
a lesser extent, Republicans in the South also used fusion candidacies. 153 The movement 
to ban fusion candidacies emerged as a deliberate tactic to eliminate third-party 
competition by locking into place the two-party structure. 154 While the antifusion 
movement in the Midwest worked to end effective cooperation between Democrats and 
third-party groups, it received support from both the Republican and Democratic Parties. 
155 Both parties stood to gain from erecting barriers against third-party agitation and 
channeling political activity within their own internal institutional frameworks. In the 
aftermath of the new barriers to fusion politics, the presence of third parties dramatically 
dwindled in contemporary politics.”). 
290
 Id. at 683 (“This significant electoral strategy allows third parties to influence the 
positions taken by the two established parties. Cross-endorsement not only gives third 
parties a chance to support a candidate who might get elected, it can also give organized 
expression to dissenting voices within the major parties. Fusion candidacies thus influence 
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independent constitutional significance of voting and the ballot itself by focusing 
on the other avenues in which the interests of the petitioners can be vindicated.
291
  
Pildes and Issacharoff have criticized the Court’s approach, arguing that the ban 
should trigger exacting judicial scrutiny because it “further entrench[es] the two 
dominant parties by dramatically raising additional barriers to competition. As a 
result of the ban on fusion strategies, third parties seeking to participate 
meaningfully in government must organize a party capable of displacing one of the 
major parties, rather than influencing one of them.”292 
 
This criticism of the ban is legitimate, not because it is anti-competitive as such, 
but because competition has been a legitimate feature of Minnesota politics since 
the post-Civil War era.  In the years following the War, there was robust 
competition for the votes of African-American because the state extended suffrage 
to this group in 1867, two years before the adoption of the Fifteenth 
Amendment.
293
 A shortage of workers in its railroad, lumber, and wheat industries 
led Minnesota to solicit recent immigrants, and this cultural diversity contributed 
to its political diversity.
294
  In 1898, Minnesota voters elected a Swedish-born 
governor, John Lind, who ran with the endorsements of the Democrats, Silver 
Republicans, and Populists, displacing the Republican Party that had dominated 
the governorship since before the Civil War.
295
 The year 1918 marked the first 
time that the Farmer-Labor party appeared on the Minnesota ballot, and the party 
enjoyed some success in electing national candidates and competing for the 
governorship over the ensuing decades.  In 1923, Minnesota’s two U.S. Senators 
were members of the Farmer-Labor party.
296
  Similarly, in 1930 and 1954, 
respectively, Minnesota elected Farmer-Labor candidates to serve as governor, 
illustrating the vitality and staying power of third parties in the state.
297
  
Republican Party dominance in Minnesota from 1939-1955 led to more fusion 
candidacies between the Farmer-Labor Party and the Democratic Party, until the 
two parties officially merged in 1944.
298
  Recently, the DFL has been fairly 
                                                                                                                            
the direction of a dominant party's platform or choice of candidates.”). 
291
 See Joseph Fishkin, Voting as a Positive Right: A Reply to Flanders, 28 Alaska L. 
Rev. 29, 37-38 (2011) (arguing that voting is an affirmative right that requires the court “to 
take into account the different circumstances that voters face”). 
292
 Id. 
293
 THEODORE C. BLEGEN, MINNESOTA: A HISTORY OF THE STATE 289 (1975). 
294
 Id. at 304-313.  See also id. at 473 (noting that, by the first world war, Minnesota’s 
population was 70% immigrant or the children of immigrants). 
295
 Id. at 433. 
296
 Id. at 477-78 (noting that “Farmer-Labor strength was threatening the Republican 
control of the state”). 
297
 Id. at 523. 
298
 http://www.dfl.org/about-our-party/overview-dfl-history/ 
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successful, electing Rudy Perpich in the 1980s, the longest serving governor of 
Minnesota, and Paul Wellstone, who served as a U.S. Senator from 1991-2002.
299
  
 
Given this history, what does popular sovereignty principle have to say about the 
standard of review that the court employs to assess the ban?  It suggests that the 
Eighth Circuit’s resolution of the fusion ban, in light of the historical importance 
of third parties, may have been a better approach to resolving its constitutionality 
than the approach taken by the Court in Timmons.
300
  While the fusion ban had 
been in place since 1900, the Democratic and Farmer-Labor parties had been 
unofficially aligned for almost a decade before their merger in the 1940s, 
suggesting that the ban had very little practical application until recently.
301
 On 
balance, the presence of very robust and enduring third parties in the state, 
particularly one that successfully combined with one of the two major parties, 
suggests that the Court’s concerns about political instability were unfounded.  
Moreover, the ban, which was more about stifling competition and furthering a two 
party system than any concern that third parties would use the ballot as a vehicle 
for promoting “popular slogans and catchphrases,” was completely incompatible 
with the state’s progressive political history.    
 
The different political systems of Hawaii and Minnesota indicate balancing may be 
more appropriate to assess the restrictions because the test does not obscure the 
inquiry into the legitimacy of the voter’s interest, as strict scrutiny would in this 
circumstance by calling every state regulation of the right to vote into question.
302
  
Instead, the popular sovereignty principle would require that courts meaningfully 
assess the interests on both sides, rather than employ absolute deference to the state 
interest which is how balancing has played out in recent cases.  State courts have 
proven that they can employ this measured and reasoned analysis to their own state 
                                                 
299
 Id. at 577.  See also id. at 588 (noting that, in 1962, Democratic-Farmer-Labor 
candidates won three state offices, including Walter Mondale, who served as vice president 
under Jimmy Carter and would later run for president in 1984).  See also WILLIAM E. LASS, 
MINNESOTA: A HISTORY 280 (1998) (discussing the DFL politicians who have served in 
important national positions including Hubert H. Humphrey, who was vice president under 
Lyndon B. Johnson; Eugene McCarthy, who served as a U.S. Senator; and Coya G. 
Knutson, a congresswoman who served from 1954-58).  Id. at 299-300.     
300
  
301
  Blegin, supra note , at 525 (noting that the Olson, the Farmer-Labor governor of 
Minnesota during the depression, made “no overt effort to unite Farmer-Laborites and 
Democrats, but he did not hid his friendly feeling for Roosevelt and the emerging New 
Deal”). 
302
 See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972), quoted with approval in 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983) (noting that “it is essential to examine in 
a realistic light the nature  [322]  and extent … of [the] impact [of ballot-access 
restrictions] on voters.”). 
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constitutional provisions regulating the right to vote.  In Miller v. Treadwell, the 
Alaska Supreme Court held that voters who misspelled the name of write-in U.S. 
Senate candidate, Lisa Murkowski, should have their ballots counted because the 
court has a “strong and consistently applied policy of interpreting statutes in order 
to effectuate voter intent.”303 Notably, these write-in ballots were responsible for 
Murkowski’s win in the Alaska Senate race in 2010, and it is not surprising that, in 
addition to Alaska’s history of political inclusion,304 the court gave considerable 
weight to both the expressive harm of discarding the ballots as well as its 
protective democracy foundations,
305
 noting that state law is “is designed to ensure 
that ballots are counted, not excluded. And this inclusiveness is consistent with the 
overarching purpose of an election: ‘to ascertain the public will.’”306   
 
Reconceiving of elections as vehicles for ascertaining the public will, rather than 
as mere creatures of the regulatory whims of the state, sheds new light on the 
legitimacy of certain state interests.  In Burdick, the state claimed that it was trying 
to prevent party raiding and unrestrained factionalism, interests that are legitimate 
but only if they are actual, rather than hypothetical in light of the burdens placed 
on the right to vote.  Hawaii’s one party system was designed to freeze out third 
parties and independent candidates, making such raiding and factionalism unlikely; 
on the other hand, voters had never enjoyed a high level of democratic 
participation in Hawaii’s electoral scheme, making it difficult to conceptualize the 
ability to cast a write in ballot as integral to their popular sovereignty rights.   
 
While the popular sovereignty principle arguably requires that infringements of the 
right to vote address an actual problem, it does so with the assumption that these 
burdens infringe on participatory rights that the people had long retained in the 
state.
307
  Minnesota had long enjoyed a political environment in which third parties 
                                                 
303
 245 P.3d 867, 869. 
304
 Id. at 870 (“Alaskan voters arrive at their polling places with a vast array of 
backgrounds and capabilities. Some Alaskans were not raised with English as their first 
language. Some Alaskans who speak English do not write it as well. Some Alaskans have 
physical or learning disabilities that hinder their ability to write clearly or spell correctly. 
Yet none of these issues should take away a voter's right to decide which candidate to elect 
to govern. We must construe the statute's language in light of the purpose of preserving a 
voter's choice rather than ignoring it.”).   
305
 Id. at 868-69 (“The right to vote ‘is fundamental to our concept of democratic 
government.’ ‘[It] encompasses the [voter's] right to express [the voter's] opinion and is a 
way to declare [the voter's] full membership in the political community.’  We articulated 
this principle over three decades ago…recognizing the profound importance of citizens' 
rights to select their leaders”). 
306
 Id. at 870. 
307
 Pildes and Issacharoff, supra note , at 674 (“The State's ability to recite abstract 
state interests in political stability, avoidance of factionalism, or prevention of party 
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were competitive, a fact that overshadows the legitimacy of the ban, no matter how 
longstanding, because the state’s interest in the political stability of the two party 
system is contrary to its historical reality.  Thus, in weighing the equities under 
Burden’s sliding scale scrutiny, one cannot critique the strength of the state interest 
without properly considering whether the voters have a reliance interest in the level 
of participation that they had prior to the implementation of the offending state 
law.
308
  Of course this interest can be subordinate to the state’s attempt to address a 
real problem in its electoral system, but the Court would no longer be able to rely 
on abstract generalities such as those offered in Burdick and Timmons to justify the 
state laws challenged there.
309
 Because of the focus on structure of the state’s 
electoral apparatus historically, this analysis also opens the door for a sound 
constitutional framework to assess the harm from anticompetitive electoral 
structures, a foundation that had been missing up to this point.
310
     
 
B. Reassessing the Validity of Voter Identification Laws in Light of the 
Popular Sovereignty Principle: A Nod to the State’s Prior Regime   
 
Voter qualification requirements predate the union, and like access to the ballot, 
have evolved over the past two centuries.  For example, the 1843 Constitution of 
Rhode Island had extensive qualification requirements for those seeking to vote in 
its elections, including age, residency, and registration requirements, and it also 
required that individuals be current on their property taxes in order to exercise the 
franchise.
311
 Other states constitutions, including those written during the 
                                                                                                                            
raiding, should hardly obstruct more penetrating judicial analysis of the actual 
anticompetitive effects.”). 
308
 This would be in addition to, not in place of, other factors that courts should look to 
in determining whether a regulation burdens the right to vote.  See, e.g., Tokaji, supra note 
, at 387 (arguing that “courts should attend not merely to the number of voters affected by a 
particular practice and the degree to which those voters' participation is burdened, but also 
to their skewing effect—that is, the extent to which they are likely to impose a differential 
burden on certain classes of voters.” 
309
 See id. at 387 (arguing that courts must assess whether the state’s justification for 
maintaining a particular electoral practice is “real or pretextual”). 
310
 Compare Issacharoff with Persily 
311
 The Rhode Island Constitution of 1843, Sec. 2, available at 
http://www.wordservice.org/State%20Constitutions/usa1031.htm: 
Every male native citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty -one years, who 
has had his residence and home in this state two years, and in the town or city in which 
he may offer to vote, six months next preceding the time of voting, whose name is 
registered pursuant to the act calling the convention to frame this constitution, or shall 
be registered in the office of the clerk of such town or city at least seven days before 
the time he shall offer to vote, and before the last day of December in the present year ; 
and who has paid or shall pay a tax or taxes assessed upon his estate within this state, 
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Revolution and revised in the early decades of the Founding, were less specific, 
declaring only that all elections “be free” and that all men be able to participate so 
long as they have a sufficient interest.
312
  However, like Rhode Island, it was not 
uncommon for many state constitutions to include registration requirements in 
additions to restrictions based on age, residency, citizenship and property 
ownership in order to exercise the franchise.
313
  As Part II shows, these 
requirements have loosened considerably over the past two centuries, with most 
states eliminating freehold requirements in the eighteenth century and Supreme 
Court and constitutional amendment eradicating the poll tax in the 1960s.  
Nevertheless, many voter qualification requirements remain, and are assumed to be 
constitutional under current precedent.
314
   
 
Given the state’s authority to impose voter qualifications,  most litigation strategies 
challenging voter identification laws on constitutional grounds have focused on 
equating voter id to other disfavored voter qualification methods—namely, the poll 
tax—rather than assessing their validity standing alone.315  In Crawford v. Marion 
                                                                                                                            
and within a year of the time of voting, to the amount of one dollar, or who shall 
voluntarily pay, at least seven days before the time he shall offer to vote…shall have a 
right to vote in the election of all civil officers, and on all questions, in all legally 
organized town or ward meetings… 
312
 See, e.g., The Pennsylvania Constitution  1776; The North Carolina Constitution of 
1776.  
313
 The Constitution of New York 1777, Art. VII, available at 
http://www.wordservice.org/State%20Constitutions/usa1032.htm (“That every male 
inhabitant of full age, who shall have personally resided within one of the counties of this 
State for six months immediately preceding the day of election, shall, at such election, be 
entitled to vote for representatives of the said county in assembly; if, during the time 
aforesaid, he shall have been a freeholder, possessing a freehold of the value of twenty 
pounds, within the said county, or have rented a tenement therein of the yearly value of 
forty shillings, and been rated and actually paid taxes to this State.”). 
 
314
 See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (rejecting 
plaintiffs claim that they had a right to vote because they lived outside of the municipal 
boundaries of Tuscaloosa and therefore were not bona fide residents).  See also Kramer v. 
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (challenging the requirements that 
residents had to own or lease taxable property in the district or be parents of children 
enrolled in public school in order to vote in school district elections, but not the age, 
citizenship, or residency requirements); Gaunt v. Brown, 341 F.Supp.1187 (S.D. Ohio 
1973), aff’d 409 U.S. 809 (1972) (seventeen year olds who would turn eighteen by the 
election had no right to vote in primary elections).  
315
 Indeed, there is an argument that voter identification laws are “manner” regulations 
or alternatively, “proof” requirements to verify voter qualifications, rather than voter 
qualifications themselves, an argument I explore in The Spectrum of Congressional 
Authority over Elections, and has come front in center in the litigation challenging Texas’s 
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County, the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to Indiana’s voter 
identification law on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not shown that providing 
identification was a severe burden on the right to vote.
316
  To the extent that the 
burden on some voters is severe, the Court noted that this burden is mitigated by 
the fact that they can cast provisional ballots.
317
   
 
Crawford does not touch on the issue of whether particular types of voter 
identification laws can pose a severe burden. Indiana required state issued photo 
identification that the state issued the ids free of charge.  Voters who could not 
obtain the identification could cast a provisional ballot.
318
  In the years since 
Crawford validated photo identification requirements, states have gotten more 
restrictive in the types of identification that is acceptable for use at the polls, a 
factor which may not raise concerns if assessed under the equal protection, 
Burdick/Anderson style balancing, but would raise concerns under the popular 
sovereignty approach.  Under the latter, the prior regime that existed in the state 
would be the baseline for determining the level of participation that voters enjoyed 
prior to the change, and departures from this baseline would be assessed based on 
the problem the law is trying to address. Even if a state did not have a voter 
identification law in place prior to its adoption, states are not prohibited from 
adopting such a rule if it is designed to address a specific problem.  For example, 
voter fraud was a prominent feature of the 2004 gubernatorial election in 
Washington state, where the election was decided by a 133 vote margin, and the 
superior court determined that 1678 illegal votes were cast including by felons, 
unregistered, and deceased voters.
319
  Thus, Washington would be well within its 
authority to adopt a voter identification law in light of its documented history of 
                                                                                                                            
voter identification law.  This does not, however, preclude a successful challenge of a voter 
identification law on state constitutional grounds.  See, e.g,, 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/setting-647/file-3490.pdf?cb=a5ec29.    
316
 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
317
 Id. at 199 (2008) (“Because Indiana’s cards are free, the inconvenience of going to 
the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, gathering required documents, and posing for a 
photograph does not qualify as a substantial burden on most voters’ right to vote, or 
represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting. The severity of the 
somewhat heavier burden that may be placed on a limited number of persons—e.g., elderly 
persons born out of State, who may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate—is 
mitigated by the fact that eligible voters without photo identification may cast provisional 
ballots that will be counted if they execute the required affidavit at the circuit court clerk’s 
office.”). 
318
 need more specifics 
319
 H.R. Rep. No. 109-666, at 7 & n.16 (citing Transcript of Court's Oral Decision, 
Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 6, 2005), available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/oraldecision.pdf). 
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voter fraud.  This law would further the state’s interest in election integrity because 
the risk of fraud is actual rather than speculative.   
 
In contrast, if the state is worried about the perception of fraud, rather than actual 
fraud, in voting, the state can legitimately address this concern through a more 
limited voter identification law to mitigate the burdens on the right to vote.
320
  In 
cases dealing with perception rather than actual fraud, the law has to have a 
minimal effect on the composition of the electorate relative to the psychic benefits 
that the state hopes to derive by having the law in place. Thus, partisan purpose 
would be more relevant under the popular sovereignty approach in determining 
whether the burden is justified, a factor that was not dispositive in Crawford.
321
  
The popular sovereignty principle would require, for example, that a state come 
forward with a nonpartisan justification for its use of only limited forms of IDs and 
its refusal to give voters the option of presenting a broader swath of official 
identification that would similarly establish their identity.   
 
Arguably, limiting the forms of identification that voters could use would have the 
effect of constricting the electorate for reasons that are unrelated to the 
advancement of any legitimate state interest.
322
   Pennsylvania’s law, for example, 
allows voters to present identification that has a photo of the voter, conforms to the 
voter's name on the rolls, is issued by an acceptable authority (the US government, 
PA, a PA city to an employee of that municipality, a PA college, or a PA care 
facility), and, with only a few exceptions, is not expired.
323
  In contrast, Texas law 
only allows a handful of identifications in order to vote: “(1) a driver's license or 
personal ID card issued by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS); (2) a 
license to carry a concealed handgun, also issued by DPS; (3) a U.S. military ID 
card; (4) a U.S. citizenship certificate with photograph; or (5) a U.S. passport.”  
Texas law provides that acceptable IDs may be expired, but must have expired no 
more than 60 days before their attempted use. Voters may get a personal ID card 
issued by the state, which does not require the payment of a fee, but does require 
multiple other forms of identification that cost money, like a certified copy of a 
birth certificate.  
 
Unlike traditional equal protection analysis, in which the partisan motivations of 
the legislature would have minimal significance because knowledge of a voter ID 
law’s potential disproportionate impact does not equate to discriminatory purpose 
                                                 
320
 See, e.g., Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867, 876 (Alaska 2010) (noting that 
Alaska’s voter identification requirement can be waived if “the voter is known to the 
official”). 
321
  
322
 See Cox v. Larios.  But see Crawford.   
323
 Applewhite v. Pennsylvania 
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under the current caselaw,
324
 the popular sovereignty analysis would take such 
motivations into consideration in determining whether the burden on the electorate 
is justified.
325
  This is a function of the duality of the analysis—considering both 
the voter’s interest and the state’s interest—rather than deferring entirely to the 
state, as has been the Court’s practice for many of the cases in this area.  With 
respect to Texas’s voter identification law, there is a credible argument that the 
types of identifications that voters can be present correlate to the partisan leanings 
of the electorate.
326
  Absent an alternative justification for the pool of acceptable 
ids, this aspect of Texas’s law would be unconstitutional under my proposed 
approach.   
 
To the extent that the constitutionality of voter ID law turns on the availability of 
provisional voting,
327
 there are constitutional constraints on a state’s ability to 
make provisional voting more difficult.  Pennsylvania law has an affidavit option 
for voters indigent or otherwise unable to obtain an ID (like religious objectors). 
Voters who forget to bring ID to the polls, but cannot swear such an affidavit may 
vote provisionally and bring appropriate ID to the county board within 6 days in 
person or via fax.
328
 This law is considerably more permissive than some of the 
other states surveyed here, and with the in person or fax option for provisional 
voters, it is flexible enough that it allows those who were unable to get an ID prior 
to the election have meaningful options for having their vote counted.
329
  Like 
Pennsylvania, Texas voters must present acceptable ID within six days of casting 
the provisional ballot, or the ballot will be discarded, but there is no “fax” option, 
making it significantly less flexible than Pennsylvania. Texas’s affidavit option is 
                                                 
324
 Crawford; Feeney.  Partisanship, unlike race, also is not a suspect class sufficient to 
trigger strict scrutiny.  See generally Veith.      
325
 Cf. White v. Regester; Whitcomb v. Chavis (determining discriminatory purpose in 
redistricting by reference to a list of factors).  See also Franita Tolson, What is 
Abridgment? A Critique of Two Section Twos (arguing that discriminatory intent in the 
context of voting rights does not mean that actions have to be taken “because of, rather 
than in spite of” their effect on a minority group).   
326
  
327
 See Crawford 
328
 Applewhite v. Pennsylvania challenged Act 18 based on state law and the PA 
Constitution. The case began in the Commonwealth Court, appealed to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, and was remanded. The law has been met with several temporary 
injunctions, one in which parties stipulated that PA poll workers may ask for ID but voters 
need not show it, and poll workers were to tell voters that they would need ID in the 
election. Given the nature of the case, the current preliminary injunction modified the 
previous one slightly: poll workers are now to tell voters that they will need to comply with 
ID requirements at some point in the future. 
 
329
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more restrictive than the Pennsylvania law.  Voters without acceptable ID may cast 
regular ballots upon swearing an affidavit explaining that they have a religious 
objection to being photographed or have lost their photo ID in a presidentially- or 
gubernatorially-declared natural disaster occurring within 45 days of the 
election.
330
  Given that Texas makes the universe of acceptable IDs much smaller 
than other states, its limitations on provisional voting would be constitutionally 
problematic because it significantly more burdensome than its prior law (any photo 
identification, a utility bill, official mail, a paycheck, or a birth certificate) without 
adequate justification.
331
  
   
Texas aside, states still retain broad authority to implement voter identification 
laws, consistent with the popular sovereignty principle.  For example, South 
Carolina’s R54 requires photo ID for in person voters, in the form of a South 
Carolina driver's license, a state motor vehicle office- or county election office-
issued ID card, a passport, or a military ID. The law removed the existing fee for 
motor vehicle office IDs and provided for a new photo voter registration card 
available for no charge at county election offices.   Prior to 2011, South Carolina 
required a driver’s license or written notification of voter registration from the 
county board of election registration, so its voter identification law, while more 
stringent, is less problematic than if the prior rule had required voters to simply 
affirm their name and address.  
 
In addition, South Carolina’s law contained a “reasonable impediment provision” 
more robust than the usual affidavit and provisional ballot option. R54 requires 
election officials to count the ballots of voters who presented a previously 
acceptable non-photo form of ID and signed affidavits indicating a reason for not 
having acceptable identification.  When the District Court for the District of 
Columbia considered whether R54 should be precleared under section 5 in October 
of 2012, the three-judge panel found that the reasonable impediment provision 
made R54 flexible enough so that the law would not have the purpose or effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, or have a discriminatory 
retrogressive effect.
332
  
                                                 
330
 Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (D.D.C. 2012) vacated and remanded, 
133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013).  The Attorney General filed suit, challenging Texas’s voter 
identification law under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  United States v. Texas, 
ELECTION LAW AT MORITZ (Aug. 27, 3013), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/USv.Texas.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2014). 
331
 Tx. Stat. § 63.0101.  
332
 However, since the decision was issued just before the November elections, the 
Court granted preclearance for 2013 and not 2012, so that elections officials might have 
enough time to properly implement the new IDs and “reasonable impediment provision” 
and educate voters about them. 
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In contrast, North Carolina’s voter identification law is an amalgamation of all of 
the issues that raises red flags under the popular sovereignty analysis: limited 
forms of acceptable ids; burdensome provisional voting; a significantly more 
democratic baseline in the prior regime; and systemic changes that, in their totality, 
arguably have the effect of constricting the relevant electorate.  Prior to the 
adoption of its omnibus election bill in 2013, North Carolina required voters to 
state their name and address, and then sign a poll book.
333
  The new law—which 
requires must be issued by either the state or the federal government, or 
alternatively, be military id, is significantly more stringent than the prior rule.  
House Bill 589 provides that North Carolina voters must present an unexpired 
form of acceptable photo identification such as a passport or ID issued by the US 
military or Department of Veterans Affairs, a federally- or North Carolina-
recognized tribe, or another state if the voter’s registration falls within 90 days of 
the election. If a voter does not possess proper ID on election day, he or she may 
vote provisionally and return with an acceptable ID before canvassing to have his 
or her provisional ballot counted.
334
  Applying the popular sovereignty analysis to 
North Carolina’s law likely would result in its invalidation given that the law is: 
more burdensome than the prior practice; limits the pool of acceptable ids; was 
passed for partisan reasons; and requires voters to travel to the county canvassing 
board in order to have their provisional ballot counted.
335
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There is no explicit constitutional right to vote in state elections, yet the U.S. 
Constitution links suffrage in federal elections to those that exist “for the most 
numerous branch of the state government.”  The Court has dealt with this strange 
turn of events by treating the right to vote in state elections as an equal protection 
fundamental right, which has, over time, allowed the Court to be outcome driven 
rather than recognizing that the strength of the right depends on the election at 
issue. Outside of the unique context of presidential elections, an equal protection 
                                                 
333
 N.C. § 163-166.7.   
334
 See Currie v. North Carolina, ELECTION LAW AT MORITZ (Aug. 15, 2013), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/CurrieV.NC.php (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).  
Much like the Section 2 case in Texas, the North Carolina plaintiffs point to state changes 
in voting beyond voter ID, like the reduction of early voting days notoriously used by 
black, church-going voters, to make the case for discriminatory purpose. The parties seek 
relief in the form of enjoining HB 589 from going into effect in 2016 and bailing North 
Carolina in to Section 5 coverage under Section 3(c) of the VRA.  
335
 While the voter identification law does not go into effect until 2016, starting in 
2014, the new law also does not count provisional ballots filed by individuals who vote at 
the wrong precinct. N.C. § 163-166.11. 
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conception allows the Court to draw lines in any way that it sees fit, so long as 
those harmed can be lumped in an identifiable class of individuals whose interests 
are sufficiently strong that their disenfranchisement is constitutionally suspect, yet 
it is this view of the right, driven by standards developed in a fairly unorthodox 
context—presidential elections—that has inappropriately determined the 
substantive contours of the right to vote as it applies to every election.   More 
important, the standard relieves the Court of the affirmative obligation to decide 
what voting requires, and it places the onus on the political branches should the 
right to vote ever be retracted.  Exacerbating this problem is that state courts have 
latched on to the equal protection conception of the right to vote in interpreting 
their own state constitutions, but have ignored the popular sovereignty foundations 
of the right that survived the Founding. 
 
The equal protection framework obscures that the right to vote is mandatory for 
state elections because it is part and parcel of the reserve sovereign authority that 
people retain under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Consistent with the natural 
law right that the people had to alter or abolish their state governments at the 
founding, voting is the predecessor of this authority and now stands as the vehicle 
through which the people express their sovereign authority.  Thus, this 
Constitution’s delegation to the states of determining the qualifications of electors 
also incorporates state level understandings that government is based on consent of 
the governed, defined by suffrage as well as the rights of assembly, speech, and 
petition, rights that were reserved to the people upon the ratification of the 
Constitution. This view of the right to vote as firmly rooted in the reserve rights 
principles of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments is more consistent with historical 
understandings of the right to vote than its current home in the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a historical framework that requires that 
judicial assessments of state regulations that constrict the right to vote be more 
rigorous than they had been under the Court’s current approach. 
 
 
